Homework answers / question archive / Question 1 1 / 1 pts According to Müller's doctrine of specific nerve energies, stimulation of a given nerve will produce    the same sensory quality regardless of how it is stimulated;     different sensory qualities dependent on the way in which it has been stimulated;    different sensory qualities dependent on the experience of the organism being stimulated;     the same sensory quality only if the specific stimulation is the same

Question 1 1 / 1 pts According to Müller's doctrine of specific nerve energies, stimulation of a given nerve will produce    the same sensory quality regardless of how it is stimulated;     different sensory qualities dependent on the way in which it has been stimulated;    different sensory qualities dependent on the experience of the organism being stimulated;     the same sensory quality only if the specific stimulation is the same

Psychology

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Question 1

1 / 1 pts

According to Müller's doctrine of specific nerve energies, stimulation of a given nerve will produce

  

the same sensory quality regardless of how it is stimulated;

   

different sensory qualities dependent on the way in which it has been stimulated;

  

different sensory qualities dependent on the experience of the organism being stimulated;

   

the same sensory quality only if the specific stimulation is the same.

 

 

Question 2

1 / 1 pts

According to Spinoza

  

the mental and the physical are two attributes of one and the same substance

   

the mental and the physical are attributes of two different substances

   

the mental is reducible to the activity of the nervous system

   

the mental is an emergent property of the nervous system

 

 

Question 3

1 / 1 pts

According to Spinoza, mental states are

  

completely independent of our physical bodies;

   

caused by changes in our physical bodies;

   

cause changes in our physical bodies;

   

the inner aspect of changes in our physical bodies.

 

 

Question 4

1 / 1 pts

Fechner thought the problem with Cartesian dualism was that it presented mind as

  

being the exception rather than the rule in nature;

   

being excessively rational;

   

consisting of innate ideas;

   

a tabula rasa.

 

 

Question 5

1 / 1 pts

For Helmholtz, the direct objects of our perception are

  

the objects or events that have stimulated the nerves;

   

the changed conditions of the nerves themselves;

   

mental representations that are caused by nervous stimulation;

   

innate ideas evoked by external nervous stimulation.

 

 

Question 6

1 / 1 pts

For Helmholtz we become aware of external objects because

  

they directly impinge on our sense organs;

   

we infer their existence on the basis of subjective inner sensations;

   

we associate their visual appearance with touch sensations;

   

sensory information automatically coheres into a stable representation of them.

 

 

Question 7

1 / 1 pts

For Helmholtz, we know of the existence of atomistic sensations because

  

we can break down our direct experience into these sensations;

   

we experience such sensations all the time;

   

they can be inferred from the structure of the nervous system;

   

they are necessary for perceptual learning.

 

 

Question 8

1 / 1 pts

Panpsychism is the view that

  

mentality is to be found only in humans;

   

mentality is to be found only in animals;

   

mentality is to be found, in some form, throughout nature;

   

some people possess mental powers beyond scientific explanation.

 

 

Question 9

1 / 1 pts

The goal of Fechner's psychophysics was to

  

provide a causal explanation of mental states;

   

prove that mental events are part of the physical world;

   

show how the physical gave rise to the mental;

   

discover the relationships between the mental and the physical without reducing one to the other.

 

 

Question 10

1 / 1 pts

The idea of unconscious inference can be contrasted with Schopenhauer's and Nietzsche's vision of the unconscious because

  

it is completely rational even though below the level of conscious awareness;

   

it is amenable to observation through trained introspection;

   

we actively prevent its outputs from reaching conscious awareness;

 

it is qualitatively different from conscious inference.