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(1) Consider chapter 5, “Free Will, Determinism, and Moral Responsibility

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(1) Consider chapter 5, “Free Will, Determinism, and Moral Responsibility.” Watch the film Detour (1945) by Edger Ulmer. Do you think, as Al Roberts argues, that his “fate” was determined and that he had no control over the unfortunate events that occurred? 

(2) After Reading chapter 4 watch the film Boomerang!, (1947) by Elia Kazan. How does this film argue in favor of Kantianism and radically against Utilitarianism? (Hints: Think about Kant’s view of persons and the respect that we owe them as members of the moral community. Think of the accused man and the district attorney's decision to defend him. Why would Kant recommend such a defense? Why would Utilitarian recommend against such a defense.) 

(3) Consider Modern philosophical skepticism as discussed in chapter 8. Could someone disprove radical external world skepticism? If yes, how? If not, why not and what does this mean?

(4) Consider chapter 9. Is “death” a bad thing? If so, then when is it bad? Why is it bad?

Chapter 9: The Self, Death, and Immortality In the last forty years a vast amount of philosophical energy has been spent on analyzing the metaphysics of death and its attendant puzzles. This chapter will adumbrate some of the key issues and arguments involving the metaphysics of death, ending with a discussion of the desirability of medical immortality" and "true immortality." For the purpose of this chapter, discussions of supernaturalism and religious conceptions of death shall be set aside. This does not mean that such considerations are not valuable or important. Alternatively, it means that such issues are largely immune to philosophical and scientific investigation. Religious studies or theology are far more suitable venues for discussions involving particular religious notions of God, death, and the supernatural. For these reasons we shall analyze death in secular terms. For the purposes of this discussion, we shall conceptualize death as the permanent cessation of life, where life involves specific biological functioning: the heart's beating, the brain's operating in a way that regulates and controls metabolism, organ activity, consciousness, cellular repair, and so on. Death is the extinction of (or total cessation of) life. One of the foremost questions regarding the metaphysics and axiology of death pertains to death's "badness." Is death a bad thing for the individual who dies? This is not the same question as: “Is dying a bad thing?" While the two questions might seem the same (or similar), they are quite different. Most philosophers would argue that dying is the last part of life and that it involves, or can involve, a great deal of pain and suffering. It is taken for granted that pain and suffering is bad and, therefore, "dying" is bad. It is bad for the person who is dying (and for the friends and family who love the person who is dying). Moreover, it is easy to identify the subject of dying, namely the person who is experiencing dying. Thus, there are few philosophers who believe that deep puzzles or quandaries surround the process of dying." Death, however, it different. For example, some philosophers have argued (or pointed out) that when death is, the person is not, so if the harm of death is thought to take place when the individual is dead, then it is harm without an existing subject. This is deeply puzzling. How can a nonexistent subject, an experiential blank be harmed? If, however, one thinks that the harm of death takes place while the individual is still alive, then the harm of death will take place before death actually occurs, which is (again) quite perplexing. Another set of issues pertains to how one views the time before one exists (--which is called “prenatal nonexistence"--) and the time after one exists (-- which is called “postmortem nonexistence®--). The idea here is that the time before we are born is not bad, even though it is a time when we do not exist. The time after we die is also a time when we do not exist. In fact, it is exactly identical to (--a “mirror image of"--) the time before we were born. So why is the time after we die to be lamented or considered "bad?" It is “symmetrical to" or a "mirror image of the time before we were born. Analyzing these aspects of time (--prenatal nonexistence and postmortem nonexistence--) is called “The Mirror Image Argument" / "The Symmetry Problem." Let us delve into these issues in more detail. I. The Badness of Death The Hellenistic philosopher Epicurus famously wrote a Letter to Menoeceus saying: “So death, the most terrifying of ills, is nothing to us, since so long as we exist, death is not with us; but when death comes, then we do not exist. It does not then concern either the living or the dead, since for the former it is not, and the latter are no more." Many ordinary people would agree with Epicurus that death is "the most terrifying of ills." However, not as many people would agree with him that “death is nothing to us." Most people would likely agree that death is indeed very bad (at least in some cases). Philosophers concerned with such issues typically identify three puzzles that invite serious consideration: (1) How can an experiential blank be bad?; (2) At what time does the badness (or harm) of death take place?; (3) How is death different from the time before one is born (i.e., “prenatal nonexistence")? Deprivation Theory One response to how a mere experiential blank (i.e., death) can be a bad thing for an individual involves the view that death is a bad thing for an individual insofar as it deprives her of what would have been, all things considered, a desirable continuation of her life. When death comes one is "deprived" of opportunities and experiences. One is deprived of fulfilling goals, engaging in projects, enjoying loving relationships, experiencing pleasures, and so on. The deprivation theory seems, intuitively, to capture some aspects of why death is bad. However, there are some serious philosophical complications. One can bring up the "Symmetry Argument" as a response: We do not (typically) lament the time before we were born. But if one was born earlier, then one could have fulfilled many desires, engaged in many projects, loved various people, etc. Thus, one could say that having been born “late” (as opposed to earlier) deprives one of many experiences. Being born "late” deprives us too, and in exactly the same way. Yet, such lamentation is not typical, nor does one intuitively think that being born when one was born is bad—i.e., we do not (typically) hold that it constitutes a genuine harm to us. Again, the question is: Am I harmed for being born when I was born rather than having been born a few decades (or centuries) earlier? As a matter of logical consistency, it seems as if one should believe in "deprivation" in both situations. Yet, most feel deprivation only in regards to death (not prenatal nonexistence). Other potential problems besetting the deprivation argument concerns the subject of harm, the meaning of "harm," and the "time" of the alleged harm. While it is common to hold that death can be a bad thing for the individual who dies, this intuition is subject to doubt. Some argue that the individual has gone out of existence by the time death occurs. The individual is not "there" at all. Hence, death is not bad for the individual who dies. In fact, it cannot be bad. When death occurs, there is no individual at all, just an experiential blank. There is no subject of harm whatsoever. The subject" is out of existence when death occurs. This line of reasoning holds that something can be a bad thing or harm for an individual at a time only if that individual exists at that time. This is the commonsense view that one has to be there to be the subject of harm or misfortune. This view holds that something can be bad for an individual only if it is connected in some way with negative or unpleasant experiences of the individual. Thus, it naturally follows that in order for an individual to have negative experiences at a time, she must exist at that time. This leads to a key question: How can something be bad for an individual if the individual has no negative experiences whatsoever—i.e., no pain or suffering as a result of the thing in question? Furthermore, how could someone have any negative experiences if that someone does not exist? Can Someone Be Harmed Without Experiencing Anything Bad? To show that death is bad one must connect badness and negative experiences in some fashion. Some philosophers hold the following view: If something can be a bad thing (or can constitute harm) for an individual at a time only if the individual experiences something negative (such as pain or suffering) at that time or latter, then death cannot be bad for the individual who dies. On this view, there must be a "tight" connection between badness and an individual's experience(s). On this view of death, an “actual experience” requirement would not be met (since the person is out of existence) and, thus, death could not cause an experience of harm. A general application of this view can be demonstrated by considering a simple example. Suppose that a professional football player injures his knee during training. At the time of the injury the player feels great pain and is, thus, harmed. But what is more, the player experiences something negative for many weeks after the initial injury: he cannot play in future games; he loses a large part of his salary; he is deprived of opportunities to prove his worth to the team; he is deprived of build a record of outstanding performance during that season, etc. This case, and innumerable ones like it, demonstrate that badness is connected to actual experiences—both at the time of the harm and after the time of the harm. There is good reason, some philosophers suggest, to question this line of reasoning. They argue that it can be shown that a person is harmed without experiencing anything negative as a result. Many examples can be produced in which it seems that a person is harmed by something but never experiences anything negative as a result. Robert Nozick famously writes: Imagine we read the biography of a man who felt happy, took pride in his work, family, friends, etc. But we also read that his children, secretly, despised him; his wife, secretly, scorned him having innumerable affairs; his work was a subject of ridicule among all others, who kept their opinions from him: every source of satisfaction in this man's life was built upon a falsehood, a deception. Do you, in reading about this man's life, think, "What a wonderful life! I wish I, or my children, could lead it?" This man lived a lie, though not one that he told. Reading Nozick In this case, the general “intuition" is that something bad can befall a person who does not suffer or experience anything negative as a result. Many hypothetical examples similar to the story above could be developed. Someone could be deceived, betrayed, spied upon, secretly scorned, etc. In each instance an elaborate story could be told that would suggest that something “bad” has happened to someone without their knowing about it and (--most importantly--) without their experiencing anything negative (directly or indirectly) as a result. These examples are intended to show that someone can be harmed without experiencing anything bad. This challenges any type of "tight connection" requirement between harm (-or badness--) and actual experience. Critics who want to maintain a connection between bad and harm can “weaken” the requirement, devising a "looser” connection between badness and negative experience. These critics argue that (in Nozick's story above and in similar ones like it) the unwitting victim could have known or found out about the badness and thus “could have been harmed.” Actual harm is not required, merely the possibility of harm. Thus, we can apply this to Nozick's story: The man in question could have found out that others scorned his work, that his wife was an adulteress, that his “friends” mocked him in private, etc. The fact that the man did not find out, and thus did not actually experience anything negative, is irrelevant. He could have been harmed and this is good enough. In order to “test” the weakened experience requirement we can add to Nozick's example. Let us suppose that the man who is secretly scorned by his so-called friends, family, coworkers, and loved ones is guarded against any possibility of discovering facts that could lead to his being harmed and experiencing something negative. The man is guarded by a "watcher,” a person who secretly watches and monitors everything that happens to him. The watcher is there, ready at a moment's notice, to shield and guard the man from finding out any unfortunate information. If someone were to call the man to tell him of the truth of his situation that phone call would be blocked! The same is true of emails, text messages, anonymous letters, etc. The watcher is always perfectly situated to intervene such that it would never be possible for the man to learn of his unfortunate situation. It simply is not possible for him to experience anything negative and, thus, experience (or feel) harm. Philosophers are divided into two camps on these types of examples. The first camp believes that in both cases the subject is not harmed. The second camp believes that in both cases the subject is, indeed, harmed. Let us explore both positions starting with the former. Those who do not believe the man has been harmed in any way suggest that in the first case the man is blissfully ignorant and experiences nothing negative, nothing bad. If this person were to have discovered the truth about his situation, then he would have been harmed. But as the story goes, he is blissfully ignorant and experiences nothing bad. In the second case, the man is guaranteed not to experience anything bad because the watcher would intervene in such a way as to prevent the man from every discovering the truth. This camp holds that an actual bad experience is necessary for harm. These philosophers argue that an agent who cannot have the relevant negative experiences cannot be harmed for the simple reason that the agent cannot have the requisite negative experiences. Consider the following example offered by the first camp. Let us suppose that an intoxicated driver is swerving a Prius down the street. Such behavior is risky insofar as it puts others (particularly pedestrians) at risk of being harmed. Let us also suppose that an innocent pedestrian is walking down the street when the drunk-driver is swerving all over the road. It is natural to believe that the pedestrian is at risk of being hit and, thus, seriously harmed by the intoxicated driver. However, let us suppose that the road has a set of barriers and barricades in place such that no vehicle whatsoever, no less a Prius, could endanger a pedestrian on the other side. In this case, the drunk-driver's risky and reckless behavior cannot harm the pedestrian. The pedestrian cannot experience anything bad, and thus she cannot be harmed by the drunk- driver. There is not, of course, a "tight" connection between negative experiences and harm, nor is there a loose connection in which one “might" suffer some probably bad experience. The barriers and blockades completely eliminate any possible connection between bad experiences and harm. The pedestrian is not harmed and could not be harmed, period! Those who are in the second camp believe that one can be harmed even when there is no negative experience present, nor any type of “risk of a negative experience occurring. Such philosophers might offer a normative moral argument to support this position. These philosophers argue that an individual's agency in the world is bound up with her having various interests. For example, one has an interest in being successful, having mutually loving relationships, being free to make personal choices, and so on. One has an interest in not being harmed, not being lied to, not being the victim of pernicious lies. One has an interest in not having one's health put at risk, or in not being maliciously slandered unjustly. In the two cases based upon Nozick's innocent man the notion of interests is essential. In the original case the man lives a life in which all around him lie to him, scorn him, besmirch him, plot against him, etc. His interests are harmed by such activity. A "harm" is an infringement upon (or setback to) an interest. Hence, the man's interests are harmed in Nozick's original example. In the second example, the same thing happens with the qualification that a "watcher" is always ready to intervene just in case the man were to learn the truth of his situation. Again, the man's interests are harmed. In fact, they are doubly harmed as the "watcher" is always poised to interfere with the man's interests. Hence, the second case is actually worse than the first case.