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Using the article attatched, write a five page paper and answer the questions below

Law

Using the article attatched, write a five page paper and answer the questions below. 

 

1.What is the hypothesis of the research? 

2. List and operationalize all independent and dependent variables examined. 

3. What method of data collection was used and the sample examined? 

4. Discuss the prior literature reviewed and its relevance to the research problem. Do you believe the literature review is an adequate representation of all relevant studies? 

5. What do the findings suggest? 

6. Can this research be generalized? Why or why not? 

7. How well do you believe the research design chosen was suited to the research question? 

8. How clearly was the data presented and discussed? Do you believe the results are substantively important? 

9. What additional questions or hypotheses are suggested by the study's results?

10. What are some of the potential drawbacks of this research?  

Received: 21 February 2019 Revised: 6 December 2019 Accepted: 16 December 2019

DOI: 10.1111/1745-9125.12239

A R T I C L E

Race and policing in the 2016 presidential election: Black lives matter, the police, and dog whistle politics

Kevin Drakulich1 Kevin H. Wozniak2 John Hagan3

Devon Johnson4

1School of Criminology and Criminal Justice,

Northeastern University

2Sociology Department, University of

Massachusetts Boston

3Department of Sociology, Northwestern

University, and American Bar Foundation

4Department of Criminology, Law and

Society, George Mason University

Correspondence Kevin Drakulich, School of Criminology and

Criminal Justice, Northeastern University,

Boston, MA 02115.

Email: k.drakulich@northeastern.edu

A series of deaths of Black Americans at the hands of the

police sparked mass protests, received extensive media

coverage, and fueled a new civil rights movement in

the years leading up to the 2016 presidential election.

Both major party nominees campaigned on issues of race

and policing in different ways. Drawing on colorblind

racism theories and the history of law-and-order politics,

we explore how views of race relations and the police

were associated with voting behavior. We ask, on the one

hand, whether people were engaged with the civil rights

issues raised by Black Lives Matter and, on the other

hand, whether Trump’s expressions of support for the

police functioned as a racial “dog whistle” to mobilize a

particular set of voters. Using the 2016 American National

Election Studies (ANES) Time Series Study, we find that

concern about biased policing and support for the civil

rights movement seeking to address it were associated with

increased turnout among Democrats and more votes for

Clinton. In addition, consistent with a dog whistle effect,

claims of supporting the police were connected to votes

for Trump mainly among those with high levels of racial

resentment. We conclude by discussing the symbolic role

of police in American society and politics.

K E Y W O R D S Black Lives Matter, perceptions of the police, police bias, politics, racism

370 © 2020 American Society of Criminology wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/crim Criminology. 2020;58:370–402.

 

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8555-8112

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6542-0095

 

DRAKULICH ET AL. 371

Several important events during the second decade of the twenty-first century in the United States

echoed events in the 1960s (Kennedy & Schuessler, 2014; Samuels, 2014; Whack, 2017). Just as vio-

lent, frequently fatal confrontations between Black Americans and police officers sparked dozens of

riots in cities across the country during the “long, hot summers” of the late 1960s (National Advisory

Commission, 1968), the deaths of a series of Black Americans at the hands of police between 2014

and 2016 sparked mass public protests and once again catapulted civil rights issues to the forefront

of the national agenda (Gately & Stolberg, 2015; Thorsen & Giegerich, 2014). A diverse coalition of

activists joined together under the banner of Black Lives Matter (BLM) and played instrumental roles

in organizing public protests and targeting political campaign events (Lowery, 2016). Supporters of the

BLM movement specifically demanded police reform to prevent racially biased policing and excessive

use of force, but they also raised broader issues of systemic racism and social problems faced by other

marginalized groups (Black Lives Matter, n.d.; Cobbina, 2019; Lowery, 2016). Those involved in the

counter-response to BLM used traditional and social media to promote slogans including “all lives mat-

ter” to challenge the civil rights claims as well as “blue lives matter” to express solidarity with police

and highlight the dangers police officers face (Bacon, 2016; Carey & McAllister, 2014; Markon, Nirap-

pil, & Lowery, 2016). Black Lives Matter and Blue Lives Matter offered explicitly competing frames.

The police were variously portrayed as heroes under attack or as perpetrators of systemic racism. BLM

protestors were variously portrayed as civil rights activists or as “cop-hating thugs.”

During the 2016 presidential campaign, Democratic nominee Hillary Clinton and Republican nom-

inee Donald Trump similarly employed competing rhetorical frames intended to mobilize the support

of voters who shared their perceptions of BLM and law enforcement (e.g., Hill & Marion, 2018). Clin-

ton aligned herself with the BLM movement (Glanton, 2016). After the high-profile death of Freddie

Gray, who sustained fatal injuries while in police custody, Clinton gave a speech in Baltimore calling

for police and criminal justice reform (Bouie, 2015; Grawert, 2016). In the first presidential debate,

Clinton emphasized support for the police generally, especially all the “good, brave police officers.”

She also raised a specific concern, however, that race “still determines too much,” including “how

[people are] treated in the criminal justice system” and that “everyone should be respected by the law,”

but she then tempered this language by emphasizing that “everyone should respect the law” and that

“implicit bias is a problem for everyone” (Blake, 2016, para. 251–255). In short, Clinton attempted to

strike a balanced position, acknowledging evidence of systemic racism in the criminal justice system

while affirming general support and respect for police officers.

In contrast, Donald Trump was both explicitly and affectively pro-police. In speeches, Trump fre- quently declared that “we love our police officers” (Nuzzi, 2016, para. 15) and “I love the police, they’re

the greatest” (Parker, 2016, para. 7). Trump accused Clinton, BLM protesters, and much of the polit-

ical Left of being motivated by anti-police feelings (e.g., Alcindor, 2016). He opposed BLM, saying

in September 2015 that, “I think they’re trouble. I think they’re looking for trouble” (Campbell, 2015,

para. 2) and commenting that a BLM protestor allegedly assaulted by Trump supporters “maybe … should have been roughed up” (Johnson & Jordan, 2015, para. 1). More broadly, Trump emphasized

a “law-and-order” theme throughout his campaign by portraying crime as an out-of-control problem.

When he officially accepted the Republican nomination, he said, “An attack on law enforcement is an

attack on all Americans. I have a message to every last person threatening the peace on our streets and

the safety of our police: When I take the oath of office next year, I will restore law and order to our

country” (quoted in Bacon, 2016, para. 2).

In short, the 2016 presidential candidates made competing claims about race relations and policing

in apparent efforts to mobilize particular groups of voters. Our interest is in how these issues were

connected to actual voting behavior among the public. We use a nationally representative survey of the

voting-eligible population conducted around the 2016 election to explore this question, considering the

 

 

372 DRAKULICH ET AL.

ways that public attitudes toward the police, race, and the BLM movement were connected to voting

and vote choice.

Based on the statements of the candidates—and informed by scholarly work on colorblind racism

and the history of law-and-order politics—we focus on two separate ways these issues may have been

connected to voting behavior. First, we explore whether support for the BLM movement and con-

cern about its central issue—racially disparate policing—was associated with greater turnout among

Democrats and more support for Hillary Clinton (the candidate who more closely aligned herself with

the movement and its concerns). Second, we investigate the role that support for the police and racial

attitudes played in generating turnout among Republicans and votes for Donald Trump. In particular,

we consider the possibility that Trump’s rhetoric about support for the police served as a dog whistle for

voters concerned about the relative status of Black versus White Americans as media commentators,

scholars, and BLM activists argued at the time (Bacon, 2016; Lee, 2016; Vega, 2016). López (2014,

p. 4) defined dog whistle rhetoric as “speaking in code to a target audience.” Such rhetoric allows

for politicians to speak about taboo subjects while retaining plausible deniability that they violated

any social norms. In the post–Civil Rights era, it became less socially acceptable to express openly

racist sentiments or stereotypes about people of color (Mendelberg, 2001). At the same time, a key

component of the Republican “southern strategy” was to use law-and-order rhetoric to signal to poten-

tial voters who opposed the changes sought by the civil rights movement, a practice that continued in

subsequent decades (e.g., Beckett & Sasson, 2004; Tonry, 2011).

The answers to these questions matter. First and most directly, they can be helpful in evaluating some

of the competing public narratives about the meaning of race and policing in political context. Second,

criminologists have long argued that public views of the police—the “gatekeepers” of the criminal

justice system and representatives of the power of the state—matter. In particular, perceptions of the

police as racially biased can diminish their legitimacy, reduce cooperation with the police and engage-

ment in informal social control, and increase fear of crime and crime itself (e.g., Anderson, 1999; Bobo

& Thompson, 2006; Drakulich, 2013; Drakulich & Crutchfield, 2013; Kirk & Matsuda, 2011; Kirk &

Papachristos, 2011; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). Through this work, we speak to the political relevance of

views of the police, highlighting a different way that views of the police may matter, and we raise trou-

bling questions about the meaning of support for the police—and the prospects for more widespread police legitimacy—when the police are used symbolically in divisively partisan and racialized ways.

The findings also have implications for the viability of police reform and criminal justice reform more

generally. Finally, the results shed light on some of the ways that racial civil rights movements—and the

backlashes and counter-movements to these movements—play out in public opinion and are connected

to political behavior.

1 POLITICAL RELEVANCE OF THE POLICE AND RACE

The 2016 presidential election was held in the wake of substantial national discourse about race and

policing. We explore two ways in which the issues of race relations and policing may have been con-

nected to voting behavior in this election: whether concern about racially disparate policing or support

for the BLM movement was connected to turnout or votes for Democrat Hillary Clinton, and whether

support for police acted as a racial dog whistle associated with Republican turnout and support for

Donald Trump. Two literatures are relevant to understanding these possibilities. First, collective action

frames are useful for understanding how social movement actors seek to shape public opinion in ways

that advance their agenda—and often provoke counter-framing efforts. Second, conceptions of modern

racism and criminological political histories illuminate the meaning of law and order political rhetoric.

 

 

DRAKULICH ET AL. 373

1.1 Social movements, collective action framing, and mobilization Like other civil rights movements, BLM is not a single formal organization with one leader or

spokesperson but is instead a collective of loosely affiliated activists and protesters. Common themes

and concerns, however, have emerged. The movement is focused specifically on racially disparate

police practices but also more broadly on systemic racism as well as on problems faced by other

marginalized groups (Black Lives Matter, n.d.; Cobbina, 2019; Lowery, 2016). Activists targeted cam-

paign events beginning in 2015 with the goal of getting these issues into the conversation for the 2016

election.1

Scholars of social movements frequently focus on the ways that movement actors frame social prob-

lems to achieve specific political goals (e.g., Benford & Snow, 2000; Goffman, 1974). Framing efforts

are an attempt to accomplish several core tasks: drawing attention to a particular problem, attributing

specific blame for that problem, articulating a proposed solution, and motivating action around the

issue (Benford & Snow, 2000). To inspire action, social movements will emphasize the severity and

urgency of the problem, but they may also emphasize a moral imperative: the propriety or rightness of

taking action (Benford, 1993). To this end, it can be useful to frame the harms caused by the problem as

an injustice rather than as merely a misfortune (Snow & Benford, 1992; Turner, 1969). Focusing on the disproportionate likelihood of Black citizens dying at the hands of the police and highlighting cases in

which fatal force was used against unarmed Black citizens are both ways of emphasizing injustice and

motivating participation in the movement. Thus, BLM worked to make racial inequalities—particularly

those related to policing practices—a central issue in this election, focusing on injustice frames as a

call to arms on the issue.

Clinton may have seen potential political value in endorsing these views, at least cautiously. From

a collective action framing perspective (Benford & Snow, 2000), BLM found a frame that resonated with a broad collection of potential voters. Clinton engaged in frame bridging tactics, linking civil rights concerns with gendered concerns that were already at the heart of her campaign—as reflected

in campaign slogans like “Breaking Down Barriers,” “Fighting for Us,” and “Stronger Together” (e.g.,

Keith, 2016).

Framing efforts by one group typically spur counter-framing efforts by other groups that seek to

redefine in the public mind the identified problem, the cause of the problem, and the proposed solution

to rally opposition. For example, to counter anti-war protestors, military hawks often reframed the

imperative to support war efforts as a matter of “support for the troops.” This counter-framing casts

anti-war protest not as advocacy for humanitarian concerns but as disrespect for the “heroes” who

protect civilians at home (e.g., Coy, Woehrle, & Maney, 2008). Opponents of BLM seemed to employ

a similar tactic using slogans like “blue lives matter” to portray police officers as heroic public servants

who deserve support rather than criticism.

1.2 Colorblind racism, dog whistles, and “law-and-order” politics A complimentary explanation rests on scholarship about political structure, race relations and racism,

social boundaries, and the politics of crime and justice. In short, the idea is that the police, in this

political context, may have a symbolic meaning tied to the racial order. Specifically, it is possible that

1Although we are interested in the connection between Black Lives Matter and voting, we do not suggest that Black Lives Matter

activists tried to influence the outcome of the election in a specific direction. Instead, their goal was to raise the substantive issues

at the heart of the Black Lives Matter movement on a national political stage (e.g., Lowery, 2016). Our interest is in how these

issues, once raised in such a public forum, were associated with voting behavior.

 

 

374 DRAKULICH ET AL.

“support for the police” may function as a dog whistle specifically for individuals who are concerned

about potential upsets to the existing relative position of racial groups (e.g., Blumer, 1958).

By definition, social movements advocating for racial equality present direct threats to status quo

race relations. According to conflict theory, some members of groups benefitting from the existing

structure of race relations will act to preserve the status quo using tools that their social and politi-

cal standing make available to them—including disproportionate control over the police and judicial

system (e.g., Chambliss, 1975). A perceived threat to one’s group’s status is critical in studies of race

relations—including threats to the economic, social, or political standing of the dominant group (e.g.,

Blalock, 1967; Blumer, 1958). These threats find their expression in prejudice and negative stereo-

types, which help justify the social exclusion of subordinate groups and the rejection of their demands

for equality (Blumer, 1958).

Politicians can leverage racial threat for political gain. Race is frequently used in the political realm as

a symbolic and social boundary (Lamont & Molnar, 2002). Boundaries—the symbolic lines that sepa-

rate groups of people—are actively constructed to serve social or political purposes. Dividing “us” from

“them” can be useful in motivating cohesion and collective action among the “us” against the threat

posed by “them.” Politicians frequently seek to redraw boundaries to draw in potential supporters—the

important distinctions between Democrats and Republicans have been drawn and redrawn along class,

race, religion, “values,” and a multitude of other dimensions. Boundaries can also be activated to divide

groups. The United States has a long history—as far back as Reconstruction—of using “racial separa-

tion” to drive a wedge between lower class White and Black Americans to prevent “a united fight for

higher wage and better working conditions” (Du Bois, 1935, p. 700). More recently, the combination

of a seeming decline in the social standing of Whiteness—a process begun in the Civil Rights Era and

heightened first by the election of Barak Obama and then by the rise of new civil rights movements—

combined with real economic harms brought on in part by global economic changes—seems to have

produced a vivid sense of “ressentiment” among some White Americans (Cramer, 2016; Hochschild,

2016; Olson, 2008; Scheler, 1912/1972). This ressentiment finds its expression in an animus toward

Black Americans, immigrants, Muslims, and others. As Hochschild (2016) described in her account

of a deep story—an affective interpretive lens for political issues—many White Americans feel as if members of these other groups have been granted special assistance and benefits from the federal gov-

ernment that has allowed them to “cut the line” in which they have been patiently waiting to achieve

the prosperity promised in the American dream.

Despite the political utility in activating racial boundaries, politicians today will often avoid

talking directly about race. When racial inequalities are accepted, groups in power use openly racial

ideologies to justify their position, but when inequalities are challenged, groups in power shift away

from racial ideologies and toward those emphasizing individualism (Jackman & Muha, 1984). The

Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s presented such a challenge and was successful in shifting social

norms such that overtly discriminatory policies and overtly bigoted rhetoric—what Bobo and Smith

(1998) described as “Jim Crow” racism—became less acceptable to the mass public (Mendelberg,

2001). The product was a “modern” form of racism, variously described as symbolic (Kinder, 1986;

Kinder & Sears, 1981; Sears, 1988), laissez-faire (Bobo, 2004; Bobo & Kluegel, 1997; Bobo & Smith

1998; Bobo, Kluegel, & Smith, 1997), or colorblind racism (Bonilla-Silva, 2018). This modern form

of racism rests on two key principles: a denial or minimization of contemporary racial discrimination

and inequalities, and a focus on individualism and meritocracy that (implicitly or explicitly) blames

racial disparities on people of color by arguing that they lack the proper work ethic and discipline to

succeed in today’s fair, equal-opportunity society (e.g., Bobo et al., 1997; Bonilla-Silva, 2018). Like

the older, more explicit form of racism, the modern ideology motivates opposition against efforts to

ameliorate racial inequalities, thereby maintaining White hegemony. Unlike the older form, those who

 

 

DRAKULICH ET AL. 375

hold colorblind or laissez-faire racist views often do not see themselves as racist, and in fact, they

may explicitly reject overt expressions of racism. Thus, individuals holding these views will strongly

object to contemporary policies designed to address racial inequalities—in some cases framing these

policies as racist against White Americans—while minimizing the consequences of historical policies

that favored Whites (e.g., Bonilla-Silva, 2018).

This distinction is important. Although both older and newer forms of racism motivate opposition

to policies that might address racial inequalities, the newer form may not be consciously motivated by

racial animus or a belief in the inherent inferiority of people of color. People who agree with the deep

story Hochschild (2016) identified simultaneously eschew overt racial animus but express concerns

about the racial status of White and Black Americans consistent with modern colorblind or laissez-

faire racism. Echoing Du Bois’ (1935) concerns about the wedge drawn between poor White and Black

Americans, Hochschild (2016) noted that White Americans who feel that they are “falling behind” or

are “strangers in their own land” tend to focus blame for their social slippage on the perceived line-

cutting of other groups and a government seen as indulging these groups with special treatment rather

than, for instance, big businesses moving manufacturing abroad.

Given this social shift from overt to colorblind racism, politicians have turned to implicit appeals and

the use of racial “dog whistles” to appeal to voters who experience feelings of racial threat while avoid-

ing direct references to race (López, 2014; Mendelberg, 2001). Law-and-order rhetoric—including ref-

erences to the police—has long been employed by politicians as a dog whistle intended to reach those

concerned about threats to the racial order. This grew out of efforts by pro-segregation politicians of

the 1960s to reframe civil rights protests as promoting lawlessness, characterizing mass protests and

unrest in urban areas as riots, and civil rights advocates as having no respect for law and order (Alexan-

der, 2010; Beckett, 1997; Scheingold, 1984, 1992; Weaver, 2007). The Republican Party subsequently

embraced the theme of law and order with the purpose of building a “southern strategy” intended to

attract those White voters (especially southerners and suburbanites) who felt threatened by post–civil-

rights changes to the nation’s racial hierarchy (Carmines & Stimson, 1989; Edsall & Edsall, 1991).

Conservative politicians relied heavily on racially coded, dog whistle rhetoric to put the southern strat-

egy into action (López, 2014), and this practice has continued in subsequent decades (e.g., Beckett &

Sasson, 2004; Tonry, 2011). Presidential candidates such as Barry Goldwater, Richard Nixon, Ronald

Reagan, and George H.W. Bush used the law-and-order theme in their campaigns with talk of being

“tough on crime” and/or supporting a “war on drugs” in the “inner cities.” Critics have also argued

that part of Bill Clinton’s electoral success was a result of his strategic choice to be even tougher

on crime and “welfare fraud” (another racialized dog whistle) than conservative Republicans (López,

2014; Murakawa, 2014). From a wealth of research, scholars have connected racial attitudes to views of

the police (e.g., Barkan & Cohn, 1998; Carter & Corra, 2016; Carter, Corra, & Jenks, 2016; Matsueda

& Drakulich, 2009) and other punitive attitudes (e.g., Bobo & Johnson 2004; Chiricos, Welch, & Gertz,

2004; Johnson, 2001, 2008, 2009; Peffley & Hurwitz, 2002; Wozniak, 2016), including support for the

death penalty (Matsueda & Drakulich, 2009; Unnever & Cullen, 2007, 2010). As recently as the 2008

election, a strong connection remained between implicit racial antipathy and support for law-and-order

rhetoric and policies (Drakulich, 2015a, 2015b). Bobo (2017) argued that we remain firmly in an “era

of Laissez-Faire racism” (p. S85).

The institution of policing has a complicated racial history in the United States. Police have been

tasked with enforcing both racist and anti-racist laws. On the one hand, law enforcement agents

have protected civil rights protesters, enforced desegregation orders, and protected Black students as

they integrated public schools. On the other hand, law enforcement officers also helped enforce the

Fugitive Slave Act prior to the Civil War, facilitated the convict leasing program during Reconstruc-

tion, enforced the Black codes and Jim Crow laws during the first half of the twentieth century, and

 

 

376 DRAKULICH ET AL.

quelled mass protests for racial justice from the 1960s up through the present (e.g., Alexander, 2010;

Blackmon, 2008; Drakulich & Rodriguez-Whitney, 2018; Wacquant, 2003). As a result, the image

of U.S. Marshals protecting a young Black schoolgirl in Norman Rockwell’s “The Problem We All

Live With” stands in contrast to photographs of officers confronting civil rights protesters in cities like

Selma and Montgomery.

Unsurprisingly, then, the symbolic meaning of the police is also multifaceted. If crime represents an

erosion of social norms, then people who are concerned about broader social change may “look to the

police to defend a sense of order” (Jackson & Bradford, 2009, p. 499; see also Jackson & Sunshine,

2007; Wozniak, 2016). In this way, the police may be viewed as a symbol of order and lawfulness. Both

crime and the police, however, are frequently racialized in American social and political discourse

(Chiricos et al., 2004; Muhammad, 2010; Russell-Brown, 2009). In this light, drawing on conflict,

racial threat, and modern racism theories, it is possible that for some Americans the police might

be a symbol of protection against threats to law and order that they attribute predominantly to racial

minorities. At the extreme, some Americans may even see the police as defenders of a racial order. Given these complications, it is possible for one person to admire the police for their role enforc-

ing civil rights legislation, whereas another admires them for cracking down on “lawless” civil rights

protestors. This variation and these differences in meaning are central to our interest. We draw on

López’s (2014) description of a dog whistle as a seemingly neutral statement that has special meaning

to a subset of voters with a specific set of shared views. From this perspective, rhetoric about the police

may be employed in the same way that law-and-order rhetoric has been historically: as a means to target

and attract those voters who are concerned about the relative status of White versus Black Americans

without explicitly referencing race.

1.3 Research questions Our broad interest is in exploring the way that views of the police and race were connected to vot-

ing behavior in the 2016 election. More specifically, we are interested in the two stories developed

earlier. First, whether support for the BLM movement and concern about its core issue—racially dis-

parate policing—was associated with turnout among Democratic voters and votes for Hillary Clinton.

Second, whether support for the police acted as a racist dog whistle associated with turnout among

Republicans and votes for Donald Trump. Although much has been written by political scientists and

penologists about the politics of law and order in twentieth-century American history broadly, few

individual-level, empirical assessments of the relationship between public attitudes toward the police

and voting behavior exist. Next, we briefly review prior research on the relationship between voter

turnout, candidate choice, and the four key factors in our study (support for BLM, perceptions of police

racial bias, support for the police, and modern racism), and then describe our research questions.

As a new social movement, little scholarship has directly been aimed at exploring support for BLM.

A Pew survey in July 2016 found only modest support for BLM overall and among White respondents—

but substantially higher support among Democrats than among Republicans. Updegrove, Cooper,

Orrick, and Piquero (2018) found opposition to BLM highest among older, conservative, and Repub-

lican men, as well as among those who live in more Republican states. Thus, support or opposition to

the movement seems tied to political ideology, even though its connection to voting behavior—either

the decision to vote or candidate choice—has not yet been explored.

Much more research exists on perceptions of the police as racially biased, although little of this work

has been focused on considering its potential political import. Criminologists have long been interested

in perceptions of police injustice (Hagan & Albonetti, 1982). These perceptions are more likely among

those who have directly or vicariously had negative encounters with the police (see Gau & Brunson,

 

 

DRAKULICH ET AL. 377

2010; Hagan, Shedd, & Payne, 2005; Wortley, Macmillan, & Hagan, 1997) or been exposed to news

coverage of police abuses (Weitzer & Tuch, 2004a, 2004b). On the other side, those possessing racial

animus toward Blacks are less likely to view the police as acting in biased or unjust ways (e.g., Mat-

sueda & Drakulich, 2009; Peffley & Hurwitz, 2010). Simply being exposed to information about racial

disparities is unlikely to influence views of the police for many (Mullinix & Norris, 2019). Although

the results of descriptive historical work indicate the police were politically relevant in elections in the

1960s, few direct tests of the role of perceptions of the police in voting behavior exist. Prior research

findings reveal that contact with the police or criminal justice system may reduce institutional attach- ment and political participation—including voting (e.g., Brayne, 2014; Drakulich, Hagan, Johnson, &

Wozniak, 2017; Manza & Uggen, 2006; Weaver & Lerman, 2010)—although fewer studies have been

aimed at examining the role of perceptions of the police or the justice system. For turnout, in a study conducted during the 2016 primary, researchers found perceptions of police injustice to be positively

associated with the intention to vote among liberals but not among conservatives (Drakulich et al.,

2017). For candidate choice, Matsueda, Drakulich, Hagan, Krivo, and Peterson (2012) found views

of the police as racially unjust were associated with a voting preference for Bill Clinton over George

W. Bush in a hypothetical election (from a 2006 survey). More recently, Drakulich et al. (2017) found

perceptions of police injustice to be associated with a preference for Clinton over Trump in the general

election—although notably this was before either had won their party’s nomination.

Although criminologists have studied a variety of views of the police—perceptions of bias, efficacy,

and misbehavior, for instance—they have rarely considered affective support. In the only study we are

aware of in which the political relevance of support for the police was examined, Drakulich et al.

(2017) found such support unrelated to the prospective likelihood that the respondent would turn out

to vote. In this same study, an affinity for the police was correlated with a prospective vote for Trump over Clinton but not significantly related once partisanship and perceptions of police injustice were

accounted for. Critically, however, the potential role of support for the police as a dog whistle has not

yet been investigated. The key feature of a dog whistle is that it is targeted toward a specific audience.

If Trump was using pro-police rhetoric as a dog whistle, support for the police should be related to

support for Trump specifically among those with concerns about the racial order. For others, “support

for the police” may indicate, in a simpler sense, actual support for the police and may not be tied to

political behavior.

Finally, and relatedly, we are interested in those who have concerns about the racial order. Follow-

ing the discussion from earlier, we are particularly interested in two kinds of views: racial resentment

(capturing modern racism) and racial political threat. As Saggar (2007) noted, systematic studies of

the relationship between racial attitudes and the propensity to vote are rare. Most of these studies have

been focused on elections involving Black candidates (e.g., Krupnikov & Piston, 2015; Pasek et al.,

2009; Petrow, 2010). The results of research on the 2008 election of Barack Obama, for example, indi-

cate that racial resentment was associated with lower voter turnout (Pasek et al., 2009) and that racial

stereotypes mattered among Democratic voters (Krupnikov & Piston, 2015). The 2016 election—which

lacked a Black presidential candidate but included a candidate who seemed to be re-engaging some

White voters who had previously felt marginalized (e.g., Hochschild, 2016)—presents an interesting

opportunity to consider the connection between racial attitudes and voter turnout. Approaching this

question indirectly, Morgan and Lee (2017) reported some modest increases in White working-class

turnout in 2016, noting separately that this tends to be a group higher in racial prejudice. In short, based

on this limited amount of prior work, it is possible that racial resentment and threat motivated turnout

among some voters and suppressed it among others.

In addition to turnout, in prior work, scholars have frequently connected racism to vote choice (e.g.,

Knuckey, 2011; Knuckey & Kim, 2015; Piston, 2010; Valentino & Sears, 2005), and the results of

 

 

378 DRAKULICH ET AL.

several analyses indicate that racism may have played an important role in vote choice in the 2016

election (e.g., Abramowitz & McCoy, 2019; Drakulich et al., 2017; Fowler, Medenica, & Cohen,

2017; Hooghe & Dassonneville, 2018; McElwee & McDaniel, 2016; Sides, Tesler, & Vavreck, 2018).

In fact, the deeply divided state of modern politics can be traced to the Civil Rights Movement as

well as to the racist and segregationist counter-movements of the 1960s and 1970s (e.g., McAdam

& Kloos, 2014; McVeigh, Cunningham, & Farrell, 2014). Although far-right social movements

may explicitly espouse racist ideologies and agendas, more mainstream conservative political move-

ments may deny racist motivations while embracing racist ideologies implicitly (e.g., Blee & Yates,

2015).

Our question, however, is whether racial views help explain or condition the role of views of the police. In general, racial feelings and attitudes are strongly linked to views of crime, the police, and the

justice system (Bobo & Johnson, 2004; Drakulich, 2015a, 2015b; Johnson, 2001, 2008; Matsueda &

Drakulich, 2009; Unnever & Cullen, 2007, 2010; Wozniak, 2016, 2018). Far-right movements driven

by anti-minority attitudes tend to support punitive criminal justice policies (Pickett, Tope, & Bellandi,

2014; Tope, Pickett, & Chiricos, 2015). We are not aware of work, however, in which a conditional

role for racial feelings in the effect of attitudes toward the police on political behavior has been directly

explored.

In this study, we build on prior work on the political relevance of perceptions of the police by Mat-

sueda et al. (2012) and Drakulich et al. (2017). Importantly, the pilot study data analyzed in the lat-

ter study were gathered in January 2016 prior to the primary elections, meaning the authors exam-

ined prospective voting behavior at a time when many voters were still considering other candidates. Drakulich et al. (2017) were also unable to capture support for the BLM movement or perceptions of

Black political threat, nor did they directly explore a “dog whistle” moderating effect for support for

the police—all key parts of this study’s core questions.

Our general interest is in the connection between opinions about the police and race and political

behavior in the 2016 presidential election. As described earlier, we are particularly interested in two

potential stories about how these issues may have been connected to voting behavior. The first story

is about the potential role of BLM in positively motivating political behavior—specifically turnout

among those in the party whose candidate expressed support for the movement and its concerns and

votes against the candidate antagonistic towards the movement:

1. Was support for BLM associated with a greater likelihood of voting among Democrats and a smaller

likelihood of voting for Trump overall?

2. Was concern about police racial bias associated with a greater likelihood of voting among

Democrats and a smaller likelihood of voting for Trump overall?

The second story is about the role of affective support for the police and the possibility of a racist

dog whistle effect:

3. Was affective support for the police associated with voting among Republicans and voting for Trump

overall?

4. Is this relationship specific to those with concerns about White hegemony: those with racial eco-

nomic resentment or concerns about Black political power? In other words, do concerns about the

racial order moderate support for the police?

5. Do these racial concerns also moderate support for BLM and concerns about police racial bias?

 

 

DRAKULICH ET AL. 379

2 DATA, MEASURES, AND METHODOLOGY

2.1 Data We analyze data from the 2016 American National Election Studies (ANES) Time Series Survey. The

survey is ideal for our purposes: In addition to questions about voting behavior, it includes a series

of questions about the police, race, racism, and the BLM movement. The survey was conducted in

two modes: face-to-face interviews as well as questionnaires administered online, and in two waves—

the first in the 2 months before the general election and the second in the 2 months after the election

(DeBell, Amsbary, Meldener, Brock, & Maisel, 2018). The postelection interview included 1,059 face-

to-face interviews and 2,590 online interviews. The survey is designed to be nationally representative

of U.S. citizens ages 18 years or older.2

2.2 Measures We explore two kinds of political behavior in the 2016 presidential election: whether the respondent

voted, and for whom he or she voted. Voter turnout is captured simply as a 1 for those who voted

and a 0 for those who did not. Vote choice was coded as a 1 for those who voted for Donald Trump

and a 0 for those who voted for any other presidential candidate (less than 200 respondents voted for

someone other than Hillary Clinton, and dropping these cases did not substantively change the reported

findings). Less than 1.0 percent of cases were missing for voting; 2.5 percent of those who had voted

were missing for vote choice. Table 1 presents means, standard deviations (SDs), and ranges for all the

variables.

Three questions were designed to capture different dimensions of views of the police. The first

captures affective feelings toward the police, employing a “thermometer scale” question. Respondents

were asked to rate their feelings toward a list of individual persons and groups on a scale ranging

from 0 to 100, with 0 representing very cold and unfavorable feelings and 100 representing very warm

or favorable feelings. Respondents were asked specifically how warmly or coldly they felt toward “the

police.” A second question using the same format asked about feelings toward BLM. The third question

taps into perceptions of police bias, asking respondents, on a seven-item scale, whether they believe

that “in general, the police treat Whites better than Blacks, treat Blacks better than Whites, or treat

them both the same.” Higher values indicate the belief that police treat Whites better than Blacks. Two

percent of cases are missing answers about police bias, 1.6 percent are missing feelings toward BLM,

and less than 1 percent are missing feelings about the police.

We include two measures of racial attitudes. The first captures racial resentment, a dimension of

“symbolic racism” widely used in prior work (Henry & Sears, 2002; Kinder, 1986; Kinder & Sears,

1981; McConahay, 1986; Sears, 1988). These views are primarily driven by social concerns about

relative racial group positions (Simmons & Bobo, 2019) and are connected to both explicit and implicit

indicators of racial animus (Drakulich, 2015a). They are also independent from a more general political

conservatism (Tarman & Sears, 2005), which we also control for here. Scholars have used this measure

2The face-to-face interviews were designed to be representative of the 48 contiguous states plus D.C., whereas the Internet

sample was designed to be representative of all 50 states plus D.C. The minimum response rate (AAPOR RR1) was 50 percent

for face-to-face interviews and 44 percent online. The re-interview rate was 90 percent for face-to-face and 84 percent online (see

DeBell, Amsbary, Meldener, Brock, & Maisel, 2018, for more information). Every state is represented by at least one respondent.

Only Alaska, at 1, has fewer than 5, and only Hawaii, North Dakota, Rhode Island, and Wyoming have fewer than 10. No single

state represents 10 percent of the data (California is 9.7 percent), and only Texas (7.6 percent) and Florida (5.0 percent) have

more than 5 percent.

 

 

380 DRAKULICH ET AL.

T A B L E 1 Descriptive statistics Variables Mean% SD Range Percent who voted 76% .43 0:1

Percent voting Trumpa 44% .50 0:1

Percent female 52% .50 0:1

Age 47.37 17.62 18:90

Percent married/partner 64% .48 0:1

% separated/divorced/widowed 19% .40 0:1

# of children in household .66 1.09 0:9

Years of education 13.96 2.63 0:22

Income (in $1Ks) 74.57 64.48 <5: > 250

Percent unemployed 6% .24 0:1

% evangelical/born again 22% .42 0:1

Percent Black 11% .31 0:1

Percent Asian 3% .16 0:1

Percent other race 5% .21 0:1

Percent Hispanic 12% .32 0:1

Percent foreign born 8% .28 0:1

Percent face to face 27% .44 0:1

Conservative 4.16 1.46 1:7

Republican 3.80 2.15 1:7

Warm toward police 74.61 23.61 0:100

Police bias 5.33 1.35 1:7

Warm toward BLM 49.26 32.60 0:100

Racial resentment 3.19 1.13 1:5

Black political threat 1.67 .64 1:3

Notes: Sample-weighted for nonmissing cases. Means for dichotomous measures presented as percentages (N = 3,649). aAmong those who voted.

of modern racism to explain views of the police (e.g., Carter & Corra, 2016; Carter et al., 2016;

Matsueda & Drakulich, 2009), punitive attitudes (e.g., Bobo & Johnson, 2004; Johnson, 2008, 2009;

Matsueda & Drakulich, 2009; Unnever & Cullen, 2007, 2010), and voting behavior (e.g., Abramowitz

& McCoy, 2019; Drakulich et al., 2017; Hooghe & Dassonneville, 2018; Knuckey, 2011; Knuckey &

Kim, 2015; Pasek et al., 2009; Valentino & Sears, 2005). We operationalize this variable as the average

of nonmissing responses to the following four questions: whether Blacks should overcome prejudice

and work their way up without “special favors,” whether slavery and discrimination created conditions

that remained significant barriers for lower class Blacks, whether Blacks had gotten less than they

deserved, and whether inequalities would be solved if Blacks tried harder. The second and third

questions were reverse-coded such that high values of the measure reflect greater racial resentment: the

rejection of structural explanations for racial inequalities, the embrace of individualistic explanations,

and a resentment of perceived line-cutting (e.g., Bobo et al., 1997; Bonilla-Silva, 2018; Henry & Sears,

2002; Hochschild, 2016). The second measure captures perceptions of Black political threat, using

a single question that asked whether respondents believe Blacks have too little, just about the right

amount, or too much influence in U.S. politics. Missing data were again rare: 2.3 percent of cases were

 

 

DRAKULICH ET AL. 381

missing for perceptions of Black political power, whereas less than 1 percent were missing for racial

resentment.

We control for two measures of political beliefs: identification as more liberal or conservative and

identification as more Democrat or Republican, each on seven-point scales. The political identification

measure contained 1.4 percent cases missing, whereas less than 1 percent of party identification cases

were missing.

We also control for a variety of sociodemographic characteristics that are associated with politi-

cal behavior: gender, age, marital status, parenthood, education, income, employment status, religion

(specifically identification as evangelical or Born-Again Christian), race-ethnicity, and foreign-born

status. We also include a control identifying respondents who participated in the face-to-face rather

than online version of the survey. Income was missing the most (4.2 percent) followed by age (2.6

percent) and evangelical (1.1 percent). All other controls were missing in less than 1 percent of cases.

2.3 Methodology The ANES comprised a stratified, clustered address-based sampling design for the face-to-face surveys

and a somewhat simpler address-based sampling design for the online survey. The survey included

weights to account for the sample design and attrition. To account for the survey weights within the

stratified, clustered sampling scheme, we ran survey-weighted generalized linear models run using the

“survey” package in R (Lumley, 2014; R Core Team, 2016).

A small amount of data was missing within the survey—as described earlier, only income was miss-

ing for more than 2.6 percent of cases. Despite the small amount of missing data, to be conservative

we employed a multiple imputation strategy (Allison, 2002), which does not depend on the assump-

tion that data are missing completely at random, rather that the data are missing at random after con- trolling for other variables in the analysis. To this end, five data sets were imputed in a process that

involved using all the individual-level variables from the analyses as well as several auxiliary variables

to add information and increase efficiency. This includes information on home ownership, stock market

investment, and length of time in the neighborhood. Substantively identical results were produced by

listwise-deleted analyses. For simplicity, results from the exploration of the interactions are presented

using the listwise-deleted model, even though results from the multiply imputed data are substantively

identical.

Although the survey was conducted in two waves, the key police questions were only asked in the

second wave, making the analyses effectively cross-sectional. Even though we are interested in the

question of whether views of the police and BLM influenced vote choice, it is possible the reverse is

true: that these views were shaped by vote choice or, at minimum, by partisan or ideological loyalty.

As such, it is particularly important to control for the respondent’s partisanship and political ideology

in models predicting vote choice. Additionally, concerned that people’s views of the police or BLM

may have been changed by a local police shooting occurring between the election and their completion

of the survey, we used The Washington Post police shootings database to identify the 160 fatal police shootings occurring in this 2-month period. We conducted a sensitivity test looking for differences

between respondents living in a state where such a shooting occurred and those where one did not and

found none. Our interpretation is that many people’s views of the police and BLM may already have

been “adjusted” by the large volume of national media coverage of police shootings beginning in 2014

and peaking in the summer of 2016.

We separately explore the decision to vote among the full population, and the choice of a candidate

among those who did vote, introducing the possibility of sample selection bias for the second model. In

separate analyses, we employ a two-step Heckman sample-selection model using “attention to politics”

 

 

382 DRAKULICH ET AL.

as an exclusion restriction3 (essentially an instrument that is associated with the decision to vote but

not the choice of candidate). The results were substantively consistent with those reported here.

Finally, several of our key hypotheses—including the dog whistle effect—involve conditional rela-

tionships. As Allison (1999) and others (e.g., Ai & Norton, 2003; Breen & Karlson, 2013; Long &

Mustillo, 2018; Mood, 2010; Williams, 2009) noted, comparing coefficients and interpreting interac-

tions is not as straightforward in logit models as it is in simple linear models. Most importantly, the

sign, value, and significance of the interaction coefficient may all be misleading. Although a vari-

ety of approaches have been proposed (see, for example, Table 6 in Mood, 2010), much of the work

has been focused on the use of marginal effects to interpret interactions in these models (Buis, 2010;

Karaca-Mandic, Norton, & Dowd, 2012; Long & Mustillo, 2018; Mize, 2019; Norton, Wang, & Ai,

2004; Williams, 2012). Accordingly, we adapt a two-step strategy based on the approaches described

by Long and Mustillo (2018) and Mize (2019), and using R’s “margins” (Leeper, 2018) and “predic-

tion” (Leeper, 2019) packages. The first step is exploratory. We graph predicted probabilities under a

variety of different values for the independent variables to get a sense of the substantive story.4 We

also plot and examine the average marginal effect of each variable in the interaction across values of

the other. Based on these explorations and guided by our substantive hypotheses, in the second step

we then conduct more direct comparisons by examining first and second differences in the average

marginal effects of one of the interaction terms across the other (and then reverse this to explore the

other term). We present a graph of predicted probabilities and a table with selected first and second

differences, and we discuss findings from the exploratory work where relevant.

3 RESULTS

3.1 Vote turnout Table 2 presents the results from a logistic regression predicting whether the respondent voted in the

election. Both feeling warmly toward the police and believing the police to be racially biased were asso-

ciated with a higher likelihood of voting, even after controlling for the respondent’s sociodemographics,

politics, and perceptions of racial threat. For feelings toward the police, the association seems sizeable:

For a 1 standard deviation change in feelings toward the police (equivalent to rating the police 24 points

higher on the hundred-point scale), the odds of voting increased by 28 percent.5 Feelings toward BLM

were not associated with the likelihood of voting overall. Consistent with prior elections (e.g., Blais,

3Notably, this is an imperfect instrument in theory: Respondents may be paying more attention to politics because of their interest

in the candidates. It is, however, correlated with the decision to vote but not with the vote choice. We also considered state-level

measures of the closeness of the election, which were better instruments in theory but in practice were related to vote choice

(Trump was more successful in close states) but not turnout.

4In addition to exploring different values of the variables involved in the interactions, we explore the predicted probabilities

holding the other covariates at their means, holding other covariates at a standard deviation below or above their means, as well

as using the actual values of the data. The figures present predicted probabilities with the other covariates held at their means,

but we discuss the results of other models when they diverge substantively (in most cases the general story—for example, a

positive effect among Democrats and a negative effect among Republicans—remained the same even as the specific values of

predicted probabilities changed across the models).

5To facilitate interpretation, the table provides two different kinds of odds ratios as well as the average marginal effect (AME).

For the dichotomous variables (gender, marriage, employment, religion, race, foreign born, and face to face), the odds ratio

represents the difference between the two categories, and the AME represents the discrete change between these categories.

For nondichotomous variables, the odds ratio reflects a 1 standard deviation change in the predictor and the AME reflects the

average marginal effect for a 1-unit change in the predictor.

 

 

DRAKULICH ET AL. 383

T A B L E 2 Coefficients from models predicting voting Predictors b SE OR AME Intercept –3.59*** .64 Female .23* .11 1.26 3.47 Agea .03*** .00 1.78 .50 Married/partner .16 .13 1.17 2.44 Separated/divorced/widowed –.43** .16 .65 –6.66 # of children in householda –.10* .05 .90 –1.46 Educationa .16*** .03 1.54 2.51 Income (in $1Ks)a .01*** .00 1.45 .09 Unemployed –.39* .19 .68 –5.87 Evangelical/born again .04 .13 1.04 .57 Black .48* .23 1.62 7.37 Asian –.52 .33 .60 –7.90 Other race –.45 .25 .64 –6.80 Hispanic –.13 .18 .87 –2.05 Foreign born –.34 .19 .71 –5.21 Face to face .14 .12 1.15 2.05 Conservativea .03 .05 1.05 .51 Republicana –.02 .04 .97 –.21 Warm toward policea .01*** .00 1.28 .17 Police biasa .10* .05 1.14 1.51 Warm toward BLMa .00 .00 .95 –.03 Racial resentmenta –.18* .07 .82 –.62 Black political threata –.08 .11 .95 –.22

Note: Odds ratios (ORs) for nondichotomous predictors reflect a 1 standard deviation change in the predictor. Average marginal effects (AMEs) for dichotomous predictors reflect discrete difference between zero and one. Average marginal effects multiplied by 102

(N = 3,649). SE = standard error. aNondichotomous. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 (two-tailed).

2007), older respondents were much more likely to vote, as were those with more education and higher

incomes. Interestingly, higher levels of racial resentment are associated with a lower probability of

voting—a finding consistent with the 2008 election (Pasek et al., 2009).

Given the highly partisan nature of the election and the polarizing debate about the police and BLM,

however, the effects of these attitudes on turnout may have depended on people’s political party. This

seems to be the case based on an analysis of interactions between each of the three policing measures

and political party identification. To help us explore these interactions, figure 1 presents predicted

probabilities for strong Democrats versus strong Republicans (the modal categories), whereas table 3

presents comparisons of average marginal effects for key values.6 Of the three, perceptions of police

6Appendix A presents the full results from this interaction model, including interaction coefficients and significance levels,

although as discussed in the methods section, these may be misleading. In the figures, the gray band represents the 95 percent

confidence interval.

 

 

384 DRAKULICH ET AL.

0 25 50 75 100

0

25

50

75

100 Democrats

Republicans

Pr ob

ab ili

ty o

f v ot

in g

Support for the police

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

0

25

50

75

100

Democrats

Republicans

Pr ob

ab ili

ty o

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in g

Perceptions of police bias

0 25 50 75 100

0

25

50

75

100 Democrats

Republicans

Pr ob

ab ili

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f v ot

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Support for Black Lives Matter

F I G U R E 1 Predicted probability of voting from interactions of police views and party identification (N = 3,233)

 

 

DRAKULICH ET AL. 385

T A B L E 3 Representative marginal effects (and differences) for interactions predicting voting Average Marginal Effects and Contrasts

Party Identification Warmth for Police Contrastsa Police bias Contrastsa

Warmth for BLM Contrastsa

a Strong Democrat .04 d, e, f, g 2.57** .18*** c, d, e, f, g b Not very strong .08* e, f, g 2.19** .12** d, e, f, g c Independent-Democrat .12*** f, g 1.80** .06 a, e, f, g d Independent .16*** a 1.38* –.01 a, b, f, g e Independent-Republican .21*** a, b .95 –.07* a, b, c, g f Not very strong .25*** a, b, c .52 –.13** a, b, c, d g Strong Republican .29*** a, b, c .09 –.19*** a, b, c, d, e

aReports which average marginal effects of warmth toward the police, perceptions of police bias, and warmth toward BLM are sig-

nificantly (p < .05, two-tailed) different across party identification (second differences). Average marginal effects multiplied by 102

(N = 3,233). *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 (two-tailed).

bias do not seem to depend on party identification.7 The top panel of figure 1 shows that feelings toward

the police had almost no effect on Democrats’ likelihood of voting, whereas feeling warmly toward

the police was associated with a strong increase in the likelihood of voting among Republicans. The

first two columns of table 3—which present the average marginal effect of warmth toward the police

across party identification—back up this story. Among strong Democrats, the average marginal effect

of warmth toward the police was not significantly different from zero, but it was significantly different

from the average marginal effect among those identifying as either Independents or Republicans. There

is a small but significant effect of warmth toward the police among those who identified less strongly

as Democrats, but these effects were still significantly different than those for Republicans.

The bottom panel of figure 1 shows that feeling warmly toward the BLM movement was associ- ated with an increased likelihood of voting among strong Democrats, whereas feeling coldly toward BLM was associated with increased voting among strong Republicans. The last two columns of table 3

confirm this story: The effect of BLM is generally positive and significant for Democrats and nega-

tive and significant for Republicans, while having less of an effect among independents—indeed, the

effects among Democrats, Independents, and Republicans all seem to be significantly different from

one another.

Given the differences between the candidates on racial issues, we also explored whether the impact

of racial resentment and threat depend on party identification. As figure 2 demonstrates, the effect

of threat seems similar for strong Democrats versus strong Republicans, whereas the effect of racial

resentment seems to depend in important ways on partisan identification. As the first two columns

in table 4 show, racial resentment seemed to have a strong negative association with the likelihood of

voting among Democrats and a strong positive effect among Republicans—effects that are significantly

different from one another.

In short, warmth toward the police was associated with an increased likelihood of voting among Inde-

pendents and especially among Republicans. Feelings toward the BLM social movement had opposite

effects for Democrats and Republicans, with affection driving Democratic turnout and animus driving

7For perceptions of police bias, figure 1 (as well as other exploratory visualizations) reveals only modest differences in the

effect of such perceptions between even strong Democrats and Republicans. Table 3 provides confirmation for this visual story.

Perceptions of police bias have a consistently positive effect that seems slightly larger for Democrats than for Republicans (and

is significant for Democrats but not for Republicans); however, these differences themselves are not significant.

 

 

386 DRAKULICH ET AL.

1 2 3 4 5

0

25

50

75

100 Democrats

Republicans

Pr ob

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ty o

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in g

Racial resentment

1 2 3

0

25

50

75

100

Democrats

Republicans

Pr ob

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Black political threat

F I G U R E 2 Predicted probability of voting from interactions of police views and party identification (N = 3,233)

T A B L E 4 Representative marginal effects (and differences) for interactions predicting voting Average Marginal Effects and Contrasts

Party Identification Racial resentment Contrastsa Black Political Threat Contrastsa

a Strong Democrat –7.14*** c, d, e, f, g –1.26 b Not very strong –5.25*** d, e, f, g –1.34 c Independent-Democrat –3.24*** a, e, f, g –1.42 d Independent –1.11 a, b, f, g –1.51 e Independent-Republican 1.14 a, b, c, g –1.59 f Not very strong 3.48** a, b, c, d –1.67 g Strong Republican 5.88*** a, b, c, d, e –1.74

aReports which average marginal effects of racial resentment and black political threat are significantly (p < .05, two-tailed) different across party identification (second differences). Average marginal effects multiplied by 102 (N = 3,233). *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 (two-tailed).

 

 

DRAKULICH ET AL. 387

T A B L E 5 Predicted probability of voting for Trump

Variable % Feelings Toward the Police

Mixed (53 out of 100) 21

Very warm (97 out of 100) 64

Perceptions of police bias

Police treat Whites better 18

Police treat Blacks and Whites equally 71

Feelings Toward BLM

Very cold (16 out of 100) 78

Warm (80 out of 100) 12

Racial Resentment

Low resentment 12

High resentment 78

Perceived Black Political Influence

Too little influence 20

Too much influence 71

Note: Predicted probabilities shown for 1 standard deviation above and below the mean (N = 2,862).

Republican turnout. Racial resentment similarly depended on party, suppressing turnout for Democrats

while increasing it among Republicans.

3.2 Vote choice Table 5 presents predicted probabilities from the bivariate associations between attitudes toward the

police, feelings toward BLM, racial attitudes, and vote choice.8 In each case, the views were signifi-

cantly associated with respondents’ likelihood of voting for Trump. Those who felt warmly toward the

police, saw the police as unbiased, and felt coldly toward BLM were all substantially more likely to

vote for Trump than were people who expressed the opposite feelings. The difference was particularly

stark for feelings about BLM. Those who felt coldly toward BLM—rating them a 16 out of 100 on

the scale from cold to warm (a standard deviation below the mean)—had a 78 percent predicted prob-

ability of voting for Trump. Those who rated the BLM warmly, by contrast, only had approximately

a 12 percent likelihood of voting for Trump. Racial resentment and perceived Black political threat

were also strongly related to vote choice. Those with high racial resentment and those who believed

that Blacks have too much influence over politics both had very high predicted probabilities of voting

for Trump.

Clearly, however, each of these views of the police and race are related to each other and to a variety

of other factors relevant to voting.9 The question is whether they remain related to vote choice after

8Each of the five measures is significantly associated with vote choice at the p < .001 level in complex survey-weighted logistic regressions. To illustrate the relationship, predicted probabilities were computed for values 1 standard deviation below and above

the predictor.

9Support for the police is positively and significantly correlated racial resentment (r = .33, p < .001) and perceptions of Black political threat (r = .18, p < .001). Perceptions of the police as biased against Blacks is also associated with racial resentment (r = –.53, p < .001) and Black political threat (r = –.47, p < .001). Warmth toward Black Lives Matter is also associated with racial resentment (r = –.59, p < .001) and Black political threat (r = –.40, p < .001).

 

 

388 DRAKULICH ET AL.

T A B L E 6 Coefficients from models predicting voting for Trump Predictors b SE OR AME Intercept –5.04*** 1.00 Female .18 .18 1.20 1.38 Agea .01 .01 1.10 .05 Married/partner .25 .24 1.29 1.98 Separated/divorced/widowed .17 .28 1.19 1.25 # of children in householda –.05 .10 .95 –.45 Education† –.08* .04 .82 –.61 Income (in $1Ks)† –.00 .00 .85 –.02 Unemployed .16 .40 1.18 1.12 Evangelical/born again .45* .21 1.57 3.41 Black –1.07** .42 .34 –8.23 Asian –.50 .57 .61 –4.29 Other race –.75 .39 .47 –5.88 Hispanic –.57* .28 .57 –-4.35 Foreign born –.46 .30 .63 –3.33 Face to face .05 .23 1.05 .45 Conservativea .41*** .09 1.92 3.21 Republicana .69*** .05 4.79 5.44 Warm toward policea .01 .00 1.16 .06 Police biasa –.26** .08 .71 –1.96 Warm toward BLMa –.02*** .00 .57 –.14 Racial resentmenta .61*** .11 2.05 4.73 Black political threata .34* .14 1.24 2.68

Note: Odds ratios (ORs) for nondichotomous predictors reflect a 1 standard deviation change in the predictor. Average marginal effects (AMEs) for dichotomous predictors reflect discrete difference between zero and one. Average marginal effects multiplied by 102

(N = 2,862). SE = standard error. aNondichotomous. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 (two-tailed).

controlling for one another as well as for the respondent’s sociodemographics and politics. Table 6

presents results from a model predicting vote choice that included all independent and control variables.

Identification as a Republican and as conservative were unsurprisingly among the largest effects,

with party being by far the strongest effect in the model: A 1 standard deviation increase in Republican

identification increased the odds of voting for Trump by a factor of nearly 5. Among the other control

variables, Black, Hispanic, and more educated voters were all less likely to vote for Trump, whereas

evangelical and born-again voters were more likely.

In contrast to the bivariate associations, controlling for other factors relevant to vote choice ren-

dered the relationship between feelings toward the police and vote choice statistically insignificant. In

exploratory analyses, we discovered that party identification and racial resentment were the primary

factors that eliminated the independent relationship between support for the police and vote choice

(when either is omitted from the model, support for the police remains significantly associated with

vote choice). In other words, support for the police, in and of itself, does not seem to have been an

important motivation for voting for Trump. Those who said they supported the police were more likely

 

 

DRAKULICH ET AL. 389

to vote for Trump, but this was because they also tended to be people who identified as Republican

and felt racial resentment.

Perceptions of the police as biased and support for BLM, on the other hand, remained strongly and

negatively associated with a vote for Trump. A 1 standard deviation increase in warm feelings toward

BLM halved the odds of voting for Trump. Racial resentment and perceptions of Black political threat

both significantly increased the likelihood of voting for Trump. A 1 standard deviation increase in

racial resentment more than doubled the odds of voting for Trump.

The evidence so far indicates that “support for the police” may simply be a proxy for party pol-

itics and racial resentment in the context of 2016 vote choice. Given that dog whistles are targeted

toward particular audiences (López, 2014), however, we also tested whether the relationship between support for the police and vote choice depended on a respondent’s racial attitudes (i.e., a moderated

relationship).10 The top left panel of figure 3 reveals that feelings of warmth toward the police had

little effect on vote choice among respondents with low levels of racial resentment (those 1 standard

deviation below the mean in resentment). In contrast, there was a strong, positive relationship between

feelings of warmth toward the police and the probability of voting for Trump among respondents with

high levels of racial resentment (those 1 standard deviation above the mean in resentment). The first

two columns in the top half of table 7 show confirmation for this story: For those with low or average

levels of racial resentment, the effect of warmth toward the police on vote choice is not significantly

different from zero.11 For those with high resentment, the average marginal effect of warmth toward the

police on voting for Trump was positive and significant, and this effect was significantly different from

the average marginal effect of those with low or average levels of resentment.12 The effect of warmth

toward the police did not seem to depend on perceptions of Black political power (note the parallel

lines in the top right panel of figure 3 and the lack of significant contrasts in the first two columns in

the bottom half of table 7).

We also considered whether attitudes toward BLM and perceptions of police racial bias were simi-

larly dependent on racial views. The effect of perceptions of the police as biased depended on perceived

Black political threat.13 There was little-to-no effect of perceptions of police bias on vote choice among

respondents who believe that Blacks do not have enough political influence in society (the average

marginal effect of perceptions of police bias among this group is not significantly different from zero).

For those who believed that Blacks have too much political influence, however, views of the police as

fair or even biased against Whites were associated with a much higher likelihood of voting for Trump

(see the middle right panel of figure 3). Specifically, the average marginal effect of perceptions of

police bias is significantly more negative among those who believe Black Americans have too much

versus too little influence (see the contrasts in the middle columns of the bottom of table 7).

Finally, feelings of warmth toward BLM were more strongly negatively related to casting a vote for

Trump among respondents low in racial resentment than among respondents high in racial resentment

10Appendix A presents the full results from this interaction model. Although we did not hypothesize them, we also explored

interactions between views of the police and conservative and Republican Party identification, but none were significant.

11Unlike the other measures used in interactions, racial resentment is captured as the average response to four questions (two

reverse-coded). Given this, and to ease interpretation, we present results for the mean as well as 1 standard deviation above and

below the mean.

12Small within-group Ns make a formal test of differences in this dog whistle effect across party identification difficult, but the results of exploratory work indicate the dog whistle had the largest effect among those identifying as Independent (in other

words, those least constrained by their party identification in their vote choice).

13But not racial resentment, as evidenced by the relatively parallel lines in the middle-left panel of figure 3 and the lack of

significant contrasts in the second set of columns in the top half of table 7.

 

 

390 DRAKULICH ET AL.

0 25 50 75 100

0

25

50

75

100

Low racial resentment

High racial resentment

Pr ob

ab ili

ty o

f v ot

in g

fo r T

ru m

p

Support for the police 0 25 50 75 100

0

25

50

75

100

Not enough black political influence

Too much black political influence

Pr ob

ab ili

ty o

f v ot

in g

fo r T

ru m

p

Support for the police

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

0

25

50

75

100

Low racial resentment

High racial resentment

Pr ob

ab ili

ty o

f v ot

in g

fo r T

ru m

p

Perceptions of police bias 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

0

25

50

75

100 Too much black political influence

Not enough black political influence

Pr ob

ab ili

ty o

f v ot

in g

fo r T

ru m

p

Perceptions of police bias

0 25 50 75 100

0

25

50

75

100

Low racial resentment

High racial resentment

Pr ob

ab ili

ty o

f v ot

in g

fo r T

ru m

p

Support for Black Lives Matter 0 25 50 75 100

0

25

50

75

100

Not enough black political influence

Too much black political influence

Pr ob

ab ili

ty o

f v ot

in g

fo r T

ru m

p

Support for Black Lives Matter

F I G U R E 3 Predicted Probability of voting for trump from interactions of police views and racial views (N = 2,501)

(see the bottom left panel of figure 3).14 The top right columns of table 7 shows that the effect of

warmth for BLM is consistently significantly negative but also significantly more strongly negative

among those with low versus high racial resentment.

14Although more of those who were highly racially resentful felt coldly toward Black Lives Matter (as reflected in the smaller

confidence interval in figure 3), ∼3.7 percent of the sample were both highly racially resentful (a 4 or higher) and felt warmly toward Black Lives Matter (a 60 or higher). The effect of warmth toward Black Lives Matter does not seem to depend on

perceptions of Black political power, as seen in the overlapping estimates in the bottom right panel of figure 3 and the lack of

significant contrasts in the bottom right column of table 7.

 

 

DRAKULICH ET AL. 391

T A B L E 7 Representative marginal effects (and differences) for interactions predicting voting for Trump Average Marginal Effects and Contrasts

Variable Warmth for Police Contrastsa

Police Bias Contrastsa

Warmth for BLM Contrastsa

Racial resentment:

a Low (–1 SD) –.10 c –2.19* –.23*** c b Average .03 c –2.13*** –.16***

c High (+1 SD) .16*** a, b –2.13** –.09** a Black political influence:

a Too little influence .07 –.94 c –.10**

b Just about right .06 –2.42*** –.13***

c Too much influence .04 –3.62*** a –.16***

aReports which average marginal effects of warmth toward the police, perceptions of police bias, and warmth toward BLM are signifi-

cantly (p < .05, two-tailed) different across racial resentment and black political influence (second differences). Average marginal effects multiplied by 102 (N = 2,501). *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 (two-tailed).

3.3 Discussion and conclusion The 2016 presidential campaign followed several years of mass protests sparked by widespread atten-

tion to a series of deaths of Black Americans at the hands of police officers. BLM activists called for

police reforms and broader societal changes to address racial inequalities (Cobbina, 2019; Lowery,

2016). At the same time, other Americans—harmed by broader economic changes and resentful at

what they perceived as others cutting in line for the American dream—reacted to the BLM movement

with shows of support for police officers (Hochschild, 2016, p. 289). Within this polarized climate,

presidential candidates Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump took differing positions. Clinton expressed

support for BLM and vowed to advance criminal justice reform to address systemic racism. Trump

expressed support for the police, accused BLM and their supporters of being animated primarily by

hatred for law enforcement, and vowed to restore “law and order” to America’s streets. Assessed in

historical context, Trump seemed to resurrect racialized themes that figured prominently in electoral

politics from the 1960s through the 1990s.

Our basic question was how people’s opinions about these two related political issues—race rela-

tions and policing—were connected to voting behavior in the 2016 election. Our results indicated that

they were connected but in different ways reflecting the opposing sides in this framing battle. Even

controlling for strong correlates of voting behavior, such as political partisanship and ideology, age,

education, and evangelical affiliation, we found that respondents’ feelings toward the police, perception

of police bias, feelings toward BLM, and racial resentment were significantly related to their likelihood

of turning out to vote—sometimes in opposite ways for those on different ends of the ideological spec-

trum. We also found that the latter three factors were significantly related to respondents’ vote choice.

Specifically, the results reveal two distinct sets of stories.

On the one side, Democrats who were supportive of the BLM movement were more likely to vote.

In addition, those who supported BLM and shared with protesters the belief that racially disparate

policing practices are a problem were substantially less likely to vote for Donald Trump, even after

controlling for ideology and partisanship. In contrast to public accusations, Democratic voters did not

seem motivated by a dislike or lack of support for the police.

On the other side, support for the police was associated with greater turnout among Republi-

cans, as was opposition to the BLM movement. After controlling for political partisanship and racial

 

 

392 DRAKULICH ET AL.

resentment, we found that feelings of warmth toward the police were not significantly related to vote

choice, which indicates that expressing support for the police as a motivation for one’s choice to vote for

Trump may simply be a proxy for partisanship and concerns about threats to the racial status quo. Even

more interestingly, we found evidence of a dog whistle effect. If Trump’s expressions of support for the

police were, at heart, a dog whistle intended to appeal to people who felt threatened by challenges to

the racial status quo, then support for the police should be associated with votes for Trump specifically

among that population. An interaction indicated exactly this: Support for the police was only associ-

ated with vote choice among those with high racial resentment. To be clear, many of those low in racial

resentment also felt warmly toward the police, but these views were not connected to vote choice.

The connections between vote choice and perceptions of police racial bias and support for BLM

also depended in interesting ways on racial views.15 High racial resentment seemed to insulate people

from the anti-Trump effect that support for BLM otherwise had. Perceptions of police bias seemed

to matter less for those who already believed that Blacks have too little political power. In contrast,

individuals who simultaneously believed that Blacks held too much political power and that the

police were now biased against Whites—those who seemed to feel they were, in Hochschild’s (2016)

description, “strangers in their own land”—were among the most likely to vote for Trump.

Consistent with the results from other research on the 2016 election, our findings indicate racial

resentment and concerns about Black political power seemed to be powerfully associated with the

decision to vote for Donald Trump. We also discovered a more complicated role for racial resentment

in voter turnout. Clinton’s racial justice themes and support for BLM seem to have encouraged some

Democratic voters with greater racial resentments to stay home on election day—whereas anti-racist

Democrats voted at a very high rate. In fact, this trend seems similar to what happened in 2008 when

the Democratic candidate was Black (e.g., Krupnikov & Piston, 2015; Pasek et al., 2009). In contrast,

Trump’s candidacy seems to have provoked high turnout among racially resentful Republican voters,

as well as to have suppressed turnout among Republicans less racially resentful.

These findings have important implications for research on the police as well as for the political

future of a racial social movement concerned with police practices in the United States.

3.4 Implications for understanding views of the police Criminologists and other social scientists have long been interested in the way the public views the

police. This study has several important implications for this body of scholarship. Many scholars have

sought either to explain how people view the police or to examine the consequences of such views. For

example, researchers have suggested that a lack of faith in the police can limit cooperation with the

police, harm informal and formal efforts to control crime, and increase both crime and fear of crime

(e.g., Anderson, 1999; Bobo & Thompson, 2006; Drakulich, 2013; Drakulich & Crutchfield, 2013;

Kirk & Matsuda, 2011; Kirk & Papachristos, 2011; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). Our findings indicate

that views of the police may also have political consequences. Views of the police were related to both political participation and vote choice in a national election and, of course, may also be relevant to

political behavior in other contexts, as well as to the formation of policy preferences, as the findings

from a limited number of prior studies have indicated (e.g., Matsueda & Drakulich, 2009). Therefore,

political scientists and others interested in political behavior need to pay closer attention to public views

of the police.

15Although our analyses reflect the role of racial resentment and perceptions of Black political power among the full popula-

tion, restricting the sample to just non-Hispanic White voters resulted in substantively identical findings for both the main and

interactive effects of these measures of racism. Smaller numbers of respondents of other races and ethnicities made cross-racial

comparisons difficult, but these results hold at minimum for non-Hispanic White respondents.

 

 

DRAKULICH ET AL. 393

Indirectly, the idea of the political and symbolic role of the police has other implications for research

on views of the police. Research aimed at explaining variation in attitudes toward the police has pre-

dominantly been focused on race, socioeconomic status, neighborhood context, criminal victimization,

and experiences with police officers (Brown & Benedict, 2002). In particular, prior research has often

been focused on the extent, nature, and quality of contact with police: People and communities of color

are much more likely to experience coercive contact with the police, and these contacts undermine trust

in the police (e.g., Carr, Napolitano, & Keating, 2007; Peffley & Hurwitz, 2010; Rios, 2011; Vargas

& Scrivener, 2018; Weitzer & Tuch, 2005a, 2005b, 2006).

From the perspective of procedural justice studies, individuals with more positive views of the police

are likely those who have avoided this kind of negative contact with the police. But how should we

understand support for the police when people have been exposed to substantial news coverage of

police shootings and a social movement accusing the police of acting in racially biased ways? How

should we understand this support when politicians use the police as a racial dog whistle? In short,

research on views of the police should be focused on considering the social and political symbolic

role of the police. It may be necessary to understand positive views of the police as the product

not just of positive interactions or a lack of negative experiences but, in some cases, as the product of racial stereotypes about crime or anti-Black views (see Barkan & Cohn, 1998; Carter & Corra,

2016; Carter et al., 2016; Matsueda & Drakulich, 2009; Mullinix & Norris, 2018). Although pro-

cedural justice theory implies that White Americans may be benignly ignorant of racially biased

policing, theories of modern racism indicate that White Americans may instead be either willfully

ignorant—choosing not to acknowledge injustice that challenges their belief in a just society—or know-

ingly complicit (e.g., Bonilla-Silva, 2018). More research on this potentially important distinction is

needed.

Additionally, work on legal cynicism and legal estrangement (Bell, 2017; Kirk & Papachristos, 2011)

should be designed to consider the potential for even greater marginalization from the police when

“support for the police” becomes associated with a particular political party and is used as a racialized

dog whistle for those who hope to see the police engage in racial control. This politicization should

be especially concerning to the many police chiefs and officers who are trying to improve trust and

relations with the communities of color they serve. In short, researchers looking to understand views

of the police should better incorporate the racial and political symbolic meaning of the police.

Of course, some criminological work has been focused on the political and racial meaning of the

police. In many studies in which the intersection of systemic racism and law and order in American

politics was examined, scholars predominantly used archival and historical methods, however (e.g.,

Alexander, 2010; Beckett, 1997; Hagan, 2010; López, 2014; Murakawa, 2014; Scheingold, 1984, 1992;

Schoenfeld, 2018; Tonry, 2011; Weaver, 2007). The macro-level scope of this research leaves the micro-

level processes by which voters incorporate information about law-and-order issues into their political

choices unspecified. We recommend that this literature and research on individual-level views of the

police be better integrated.

3.5 Conclusion: A postracial era? Racial civil rights issues were relevant to the 2016 election: Many voters seemed motivated by the

conviction that Black lives matter. In addition to the results reported here, the responses from a series

of surveys conducted since the beginning of the BLM movement indicate that awareness of racially

disparate policing has increased even among White Americans, that White Americans increasingly

agree that society needs to do more to ensure equal rights, and that even Republicans believe President

Trump has worsened race relations (Pew Research Center, 2014, 2015, 2017).

 

 

394 DRAKULICH ET AL.

At the same time, the results of this research seem to confirm the suggestion that there is a festering

reserve of “ressentiment”—racially charged anger about the state of the country directed at, among

others, Black citizens. The Civil Rights Movement in the twentieth century gave conservative candi-

dates the opportunity to activate and tap into voters’ concerns about the changes to the racial order

these movements presented—often by using crime and justice issues as racial dog whistles (e.g., Beck-

ett & Sasson, 2004; Tonry, 2011). Our results indicate this was again the case in the 2016 election,

in which “support for the police” seemed to be a signal that mattered particularly to voters with high

levels of racial resentment. This finding reaffirms theories of colorblind and laissez-faire racism (Bobo

& Smith, 1998; Bobo et al., 1997; Bonilla-Silva, 2018) and shows that a subset of Americans may be

cloaking their concerns about the racial order behind a superficially nonracial support of the police.

These findings also put the supposed “postracial” era in a new light. After decades of declining rates

of explicit racism (Schuman, Steeh, Bobo, & Krysan, 1997), a lack of racial law-and-order rhetoric

among general election campaigns between 2000 and 2012, and amidst the immense popularity of

presidential candidate Barack Obama in 2007 and 2008, talk began of a new postracial era—a narrative

Obama himself embraced (Obama, 2008).

Many scholars, however, warned of the persistence and influence of less explicit indicators of racist

sentiment (e.g., Bonilla-Silva, 2015, 2018; Drakulich, 2015a, 2015b). It is now clear that this postracial

era was illusory—a view even Obama now shares (Rupert, 2017). Instead, the era may simply have

been one in which racially progressive talk was made possible by the lack of significant threats to

the racial status quo. The emergence of a direct threat—in the form of a social movement focused on

racial inequalities—may have also caused a more explicit racism to resurface, with consequences for

American politics and society more broadly.

ORCID

Kevin Drakulich https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8555-8112 Kevin H. Wozniak https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6542-0095

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AUTHOR BIOGRAPHIES

Kevin Drakulich is an Associate Professor in the School of Criminology and Criminal Justice at Northeastern University. His research broadly focuses on perceptions of race, crime, and justice

both within communities and in broader social and political contexts.

Kevin H. Wozniak is an associate professor of sociology at the University of Massachusetts Boston. He studies public opinion and the politics of criminal justice.

John Hagan is the John D. MacArthur Professor of Sociology and Law at Northwestern University and the American Bar Foundation. His research focuses on international criminal law, the effects

of parental incarceration on children, and, most recently, on the historical persistence of issues of

inequality, crime, and criminal justice in Chicago.

Devon Johnson is an Associate Professor of Criminology, Law and Society at George Mason Uni- versity. Her recent research examines public opinion toward punishment and perceptions of police

legitimacy in the United States and the Caribbean.

How to cite this article: Drakulich K, Wozniak KH, Hagan J, Johnson D. Race and polic- ing in the 2016 presidential election: Black lives matter, the police, and dog whistle politics.

Criminology. 2020;58:370–402. https://doi.org/10.1111/1745-9125.12239

APPENDIX A: COEFFICIENTS FROM INTERACTIONS

Turnout Vote for Trump Variable b SE b SE b SE b SE Intercept –4.39*** .72 –2.02** .60 –.54 1.96 –7.92*** 1.58 Female .23* .10 .26** .10 .20 .14 .24 .14 Age .03*** .00 .03*** .00 .00 .00 .01 .00 Married/partner .16 .11 .19 .11 .26 .18 .26 .19 Separated/divorced/widowed –.50*** .14 –.49*** .14 .16 .22 .21 .22 # of children in household –.10* .04 –.10* .04 –.08 .07 –.06 .07 Education .16*** .02 .16*** .02 –.09** .03 –.09** .03 Income (in $1Ks) .01*** .00 .01*** .00 .00* .00 .00* .00 Unemployed –.44* .17 –.48** .17 .09 .30 –.01 .31 Evangelical/born again .07 .12 .03 .12 .36* .16 .36* .16 Black .14 .18 .31 .17 –1.25*** .33 –1.08*** .32 Asian –.39 .29 –.42 .28 –.44 .44 –.38 .46 Other race –.56** .20 –.52** .20 –.78* .33 –.78* .34 Hispanic –.21 .15 –.23 .14 –.57* .25 –.56* .25

 

https://doi.org/10.1111/1745-9125.12239

 

402 DRAKULICH ET AL.

Turnout Vote for Trump Variable b SE b SE b SE b SE Foreign born –.42* .17 –.39* .17 –.26 .29 –.28 .30 Face to face .37** .11 .36** .11 .20 .15 .22 .15 Conservative .02 .04 .07 .04 .42*** .07 .42*** .07 Republican .11 .14 –.53*** .09 .68*** .04 .69*** .04 Warm toward police .00 .00 .01*** .00 –.04** .01 .01 .01 Police bias .20* .08 .10* .04 –.26 .24 .10 .18 Warm toward BLM .02*** .00 .00 .00 –.04** .01 –.01 .01 Racial resentment –.10 .06 –.66*** .11 –.67 .52 .68*** .09 Black political threat –.10 .09 –.09 .17 .35** .12 1.77* .75 Warm police × Republican .00* .00 Police bias × Republican –.03 .02 Warm BLM × Republican –.00*** .00 Resentment × Republican .15*** .02 Political threat × Republican .00 .04 Warm police × resentment .01*** .00 Police bias × resentment .00 .07 Warm BLM × resentment .01* .00 Warm police × political threat .00 .01 Police bias × political threat –.21* .10 Warm BLM × political threat –.01 .00

Notes: N for turnout = 3,233; N for vote for Trump = 2,501. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 (two-tailed).

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