Problem 1: Assume there are 3 voters with the following rank order preferences over three candidates, A, B and C: Voter 1 voter 2 voter 3 A B B C A A B Voters cast secret ballots wherein each must decide whether to specify only their ist ranked or both their 1st and 2nd ranked candidates as "acceptable" (i

Problem 1: Assume there are 3 voters with the following rank order preferences over three candidates, A, B and C: Voter 1 voter 2 voter 3 A B B C A A B Voters cast secret ballots wherein each must decide whether to specify only their ist ranked or both their 1st and 2nd ranked candidates as "acceptable" (i.e., Approval Voting). The candidate receiving the most acceptable votes wins, with a fair lottery used to break ties. Assuming that each voter assigns a utility value of 1, v, and 0 (with 1 > v > 0) to these candidates: a. Will any candidate win straight out in equilibrium. If so, describe the equilibrium? b. Does a pure strategy equilibrium exist for some range of v? If so, find all such equilibria and the corresponding range(s) of v