Homework answers / question archive / How to Write a “Brief” Use the following “IRAC” (Issue Rule Application Conclusion) format: Issue: What question must be answered in order to reach a conclusion in the case? The Issue must be expressed in the form of a legal question which, when answered, gives the result in the case

How to Write a “Brief” Use the following “IRAC” (Issue Rule Application Conclusion) format: Issue: What question must be answered in order to reach a conclusion in the case? The Issue must be expressed in the form of a legal question which, when answered, gives the result in the case

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How to Write a “Brief” Use the following “IRAC” (Issue Rule Application Conclusion) format: Issue: What question must be answered in order to reach a conclusion in the case? The Issue must be expressed in the form of a legal question which, when answered, gives the result in the case. Make it specific (e.g. “Has there been a false imprisonment if the plaintiff was asleep at the time of ‘confinement’?”) rather than general (e.g. Did the defendant owe a duty of care to the plaintiff when the plaintiff was trespassing on the defendant’s property?). Some cases present more than one issue; if there is more than one issue, it is OK to write more than one, but be sure to list the principal one and focus on that. Rule: The Rule is the law that applies to the principal issue. It should be stated as a general principal, (e.g. A duty of care is owed whenever the defendant should anticipate that her conduct could create a risk of harm to the plaintiff.) not a conclusion to the case being briefed, (e.g. “The plaintiff was negligent.”). Typically, the Rule can be expressed in one or two sentences. Application: The Application is a discussion of how the Rule applies to the facts of the case. Essentially, the Application section is a description of the relevant facts, the parties’ arguments and positions in the case, and the court’s thought process by which it answered the Issue and established the Rule. While the Issue and Rule are normally only one or two sentences each, the Application section of a brief should be two to four paragraphs long. It should be a written debate, not simply a statement of the Conclusion. Whenever possible, present both sides of any issue. Do not begin with your Conclusion. The Application section shows how you can track the court’s reasoning on paper and is the most difficult skill you will learn. It is also permissible to put the relevant facts of the case in a separate section of the Brief. Conclusion: What was the result of the case? Did the appellate or supreme court affirm, reverse or reverse and remand the lower court’s decision? The case gives you a background of the facts along with the judge’s reasoning and conclusion. When you brief cases, you are summarizing the judge’s opinion. Briefs should not have to exceed more than two pages in length. Peterson v. AT&T Mobility Services, LLC 134 F. Supp. 3d 112 (D.D.C. 2015) John Peterson began working for AT&T in October 2004. He was originally in an hourly position covered by a collective bargaining agreement, which called for graduated disciplinary measures before a covered employee could be fired. He excelled in the position and, after about three years, was promoted to a salaried managerial position, which was not covered by any collective bargaining agreement. Even though he resigned from the union at that point and understood he would no longer be represented by the union or subject to the agreement, he claimed to “clearly remember” that his manager at the time assured him that graduated disciplinary measures still applied. AT&T both denied that Peterson was told the latter and claimed that there was no graduated disciplinary policy for salaried management employees. That dispute was relevant because in October 2010 (at which point Peterson had been promoted twice and was serving as a national retail account executive), AT&T fired Peterson without any graduated discipline process. As a national retail account executive, Peterson was required to travel by car regularly in his territory, on average driving about 250 miles per week. Peterson was nominally fired for violating a company policy, included in AT&T’s Code of Business Conduct, which required all employees “regardless of their job duties” to report “any driving-related offense that involves intoxication” and employees “whose job involves operation of a company-owned” or leased vehicle to “also report [a]ll tickets, citations, arrests, charges, convictions, guilty pleas . . . for any driving-related offense other than parking tickets, equipment violations or other non-moving violations.” Peterson had several infractions encompassed by the latter. Peterson had a contentious relationship with his immediate supervisor. While she was on leave in August 2010, Peterson made an off-hand comment to his acting supervisor that he had a poor driving record. That comment prompted the acting supervisor to investigate Peterson’s driving record. That investigation uncovered Peterson’s infractions, which he had otherwise not reported to AT&T. His supervisor fired him as a result. Peterson sued AT&T for breach of contract and wrongful termination. AT&T moved for summary judgment. Beryl A. Howell, U.S. District Judge The parties agree that no written employment agreement exists between the parties, but the plaintiff nevertheless contends that AT&T breached an employment agreement by terminating him without first applying graduated disciplinary measures, which a former supervisor allegedly orally conveyed to him when he was first promoted to a managerial position. The plaintiff also claims wrongful termination because he was not provided with, or made aware of, the company policy requiring the reporting of “all traffic infractions, whether or not the ticket even results in a fine or conviction,” the violation of which policy led to his dismissal. AT&T contends that, as an at-will employee, the plaintiff was subject to termination at any time for any reason, and that the nature of this employment relationship was never qualified by any oral agreement. Consequently, AT&T argues that both of the plaintiff’s claims fail as a matter of law since no breach of contract occurred and his termination was not wrongful because AT&T simply exercised its right to terminate the plaintiff, not in violation of any “clear mandate of public policy,” and, in any event, was justified in doing so due to the plaintiff’s violation of company policy. Each of the plaintiff’s claims is discussed . . . below. A. Breach of Contract The plaintiff premises his breach of contract claim on an alleged oral promise, made by his then-manager when he accepted a managerial position, that the right he enjoyed as a union employee to verbal and written warnings prior to termination would nonetheless continue. AT&T counters that it is entitled to summary judgment on this claim because, after ample discovery, the plaintiff has failed to provide any admissible evidence to support this claim, other than his own self-serving statement in his affidavit about an oral promise, which is contradicted by his deposition testimony. The Court agrees with AT&T. Under District of Columbia law, employment is presumed to be terminable at will by either party, and the presumption is rebuttable by “a showing that ‘the parties intended that termination be subject to specific preconditions.’” Futrell v. Dep’t of Labor Federal Credit Union, 816 A.2d 793, 806 (D.C. 2003). Employee personnel or policy manuals may create contractual rights for the employee but “such implied contractual rights can be disclaimed, and ‘the legal effect of such a disclaimer, is in the first instance, a question for the court to decide.’” Id. “The facts and circumstances surrounding the hiring and the conduct of the parties may provide evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption.” Nickens v. Labor Agency of Metro. Wash., 600 A.2d 813, 816 (D.C. 1991). In the instant case, the plaintiff seeks to imply a contractual right to specific termination preconditions based on a “promise” received from a former supervisor when he was first promoted to a managerial position, two jobs prior to the one he had when he was ultimately terminated in October 2010. The only evidence he presents, however, is his own affidavit, despite months of discovery, stating that “I clearly remember [my supervisor at the time] saying that the same sort of graduated response for discipline—verbal warning, written warning and final written discharge—applied to the new job.” Plaintiff presents no corroboration for this recollection, such as an affidavit or deposition testimony from the former supervisor, who allegedly made the statement, or any other witness. [T]he veracity of the plaintiff’s recollection is significantly undermined by the plaintiff’s clear deposition testimony that he fully understood that his new managerial position would require forfeit of all of his rights that he may have had under the union, which would include the collective bargaining agreement’s requirement of graduated warnings. The plausibility of the purported oral precondition applying to the plaintiff is also undermined by the plaintiff’s admissions at his deposition that, while he received documentation regarding performance quotas, he never received “any document that discussed disciplinary procedures” for “policy violations.” Given the lack of corroboration of the alleged oral precondition, as well as the plaintiff’s own testimony, at both his deposition and in his affidavit, acknowledging that, as a manager, he was no longer subject to union protection, the plaintiff’s recollection of an oral precondition, without more, is insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact on which a reasonable jury could conclude that the plaintiff’s at-will employment was specially conditioned for him to receive the graduated warnings prior to termination to which union members were entitled. Accordingly, AT&T is entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiff’s breach of contract claim. B. Wrongful Termination The plaintiff apparently believes that the “real issue which led to [his] termination had nothing to do with driving or failing to report anything or violating any rules” and that the “idea that [he] was fired for not reporting one or more speeding tickets is simply not the true reason.” Consequently, he argues his supervisor’s “single-minded objective” was to terminate his employment and she “did not care what the reason was.” Even if the plaintiff’s belief and argument are correct, this is not sufficient to sustain a wrongful termination claim. “It has long been the common law in this jurisdiction that an at-will employee may be discharged ‘at any time and for any reason, or for no reason at all.’” Rosella v. Long Rap, Inc., 121 A.3d 775, 777 (D.C. 2015) (quoting Adams v. George W. Cochran & Co., 597 A.2d 28, 30 (D.C. 1991)). In Adams, the D.C. Court of Appeals recognized a “very narrow” non-statutory exception to this doctrine when “an employer’s discharge of an employee for the employee’s refusal to violate a statute is a wrongful discharge in violation of public policy.” 597 A.2d at 34. Thus, to bring a wrongful termination claim in the District of Columbia, the plaintiff must demonstrate that his discharge violates a clear mandate of public policy, as expressed in statute, regulations or the Constitution. The plaintiff was terminated for violation of a company policy requiring immediate reporting of any driving offenses. The plaintiff argues that his termination was wrongful because it was “mean-spirited,” illegitimate because he was unaware of the policies he violated, and mistaken because the plaintiff was ultimately awarded unemployment benefits over the objection of AT&T that he was fired for cause. The plaintiff, however, fails to explain—and the Court cannot discern—how his discharge, even if it were “trumped-up,” violated a “clear mandate of public policy” implicit in “statutes or municipal regulations, or in the Constitution.” To the contrary, AT&T’s enforcement of its internal policies and standards for safe driving serve as a means of monitoring the driving records and, thereby, minimizing the driving risks posed by its employees, particularly those engaged in driving on company business, where accidents could result in liability and reputational harm to AT&T. As such, these internal policies carry public policy benefits. At the same time, the plaintiff’s distress is understandable that, after six years of successive advancement in positions at AT&T, his employment at the company was abruptly terminated. Even if the plaintiff’s [sic] correctly perceives that AT&T “overreacted and adopted a hair-trigger approach” to his driving offenses, however, “[i]t is not the Judiciary’s place to micro-manage an employer’s” enforcement of its internal policies since, “[a]s the Supreme Court has stated, ‘[c]ourts are generally less competent than employers to restructure business practices, and unless mandated to do so by Congress they should not attempt it.’” Brady v. Office of the Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d 490, 496 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 578 (1978)). Accordingly, AT&T is entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiff’s wrongful termination claim. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, AT&T’s motion for summary judgment is granted. . . . Gaskell v. University of Kentucky 2010 WL 4867630 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 23, 2010) In 2007, the University of Kentucky (UK) commenced a search for the founding director of its new astronomics observatory. Martin Gaskell applied for the position and, initially, was regarded by the Search Committee as the leading candidate. He was far more qualified and experienced than any of the other applicants. At the time of his application, Gaskell worked at the University of Nebraska–Lincoln (UNL), where he had secured funding for, had overseen the design and construction of, and eventually ran the student observatory. The Search Committee conducted an initial round of phone interviews with Gaskell and several other candidates. Following the phone interviews, the committee ranked Gaskell first among the candidates. Gaskell’s candidacy hit some snags, though. When Michael Cavagnero, the chair of the Department of Physics & Astronomy and a member of the Search Committee, contacted Gaskell’s supervisor at UNL, he learned that Gaskell had caused some conflict at UNL because he was sometimes obstinate. In addition, members of the Search Committee discovered articles, lecture notes, and public statements by Gaskell revolving around the theme of “Modern Astronomy, the Bible, and Creation.” These raised concerns that Gaskell was a “creationist.” Several Search Committee members perceived that Gaskell blended religious thought with scientific theory, which they believed would adversely affect his ability to perform the outreach functions of the job. Cavagnero again contacted Gaskell’s supervisor at UNL and asked him whether Gaskell’s personal religious beliefs had interfered with his duties in the classroom and in the community at UNL. According to the supervisor, a handful of students had mentioned in their teacher evaluations that it was refreshing to have a professor who believed in God, but that otherwise, Gaskell’s views on religion had not interfered with his work. Cavagnero also asked some of his colleagues to read Gaskell’s work to determine if it was “good science.” Notably, members of the UK Biology Department participated in this review and determined that Gaskell’s writing included scientific statements about evolution that showed a fundamental lack of appreciation for the scientific method and for well-established scientific principles. The biologists ultimately told Cavagnero that they would not work with one of “these types of individuals” if he was hired to direct the observatory. UK ultimately hired Timothy Knauer, a former student and employee of UK’s Department of Physics and Astronomy. Although UK concedes that Gaskell had more education and experience, it contends that it hired Knauer because he demonstrated more of the qualities that UK wanted in its Observatory Director. Gaskell sued UK claiming that he was not hired because of his religion in violation of Title VII. Both parties moved for summary judgment. Forester, Senior Judge Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides that “[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to discharge any individual, or otherwise discriminate against an individual with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s . . . religion.” The term “religion” is defined to include “all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee’s . . . religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.” As in any other discriminatory discharge or refusal to hire case, the plaintiff can establish that he was discharged or not hired on the basis of his religion through direct or indirect means. Direct evidence is evidence which, if believed, “requires the conclusion that unlawful discrimination was at least a motivating factor in the employer’s actions.” Direct evidence “does not require the factfinder to draw any inferences in order to conclude that the challenged employment action was motivated at least in part by prejudice against members of the protected group.” Evidence which in and of itself suggests that the person or persons with the power to hire, fire, promote, or demote the plaintiff were animated by an illegal employment criterion amounts to direct proof of discrimination. Remarks to the effect that “I won’t hire you because you’re a woman,” or “I’m firing you because you’re not a Christian,” are obvious examples of direct evidence of discrimination. However, other, less obvious remarks, have been found to be direct evidence of discrimination. Remarks and other evidence that reflect a propensity by the decisionmaker to evaluate employees based on illegal criteria can suffice as direct evidence of discrimination even if the evidence stops short of a virtual admission of illegality. Proof of this nature supports the inference that a statutorily prescribed factor such as religion was at least a motivating factor in the adverse employment action at issue. If there is no direct evidence of discrimination, then courts rely on the framework established in the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Under this framework, the plaintiff carries the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of discrimination. If the plaintiff is able to prove a prima facie case, then the burden shifts to the defendant “to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s rejection.” If the defendant is able to carry this burden, then the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered were not true reasons but were a pretext for discrimination. UK argues that it hired a different candidate for the Observatory Director for reasons that have nothing to do with Gaskell’s religion. Because Gaskell has failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that UK’s reasons were a pretext for discrimination, UK contends that, based on McDonnell Douglas analysis, Gaskell’s claims must be dismissed. Although UK argues that the McDonnell Douglas framework applies to this case, Gaskell contends that he has presented direct evidence of discrimination. The record contains substantial evidence that Gaskell was a leading candidate for the position until the issue of his religion (as Gaskell calls it) or his scientific position (as UK calls it) became an issue. Specifically, he points to the e-mail written by [Professor Thomas] Troland, the Search Committee Chair, to Cavagnero just days prior to the Search Committee’s vote to recommend Knauer for the position and thereby reject Gaskell. The e-mail, with the sub...