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As a manager of the firm, you calculate that the marginal revenue is R200 and the marginal cost is R1500

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As a manager of the firm, you calculate that the marginal revenue is R200 and the marginal cost is R1500. You should:

a) decrease output.

b) do nothing since you don't have information about average fixed costs.

c) reduce output to where marginal revenue is equal to marginal costs.

d) increase output to where marginal revenue is equal to marginal costs.

e) maintain the current output unchanged.

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