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Gillette (firm 1) and Schick (firm 2) are the only two firms in the market for disposable razors

Economics Dec 14, 2020

Gillette (firm 1) and Schick (firm 2) are the only two firms in the market for disposable razors. The market inverse demand function for razors is P = 95 − q1 − q2. Each firm has constant marginal costs given by MC = 5, and zero fixed costs.

In the equilibrium of a Cournot duopoly, each firm will supply an output of units, the market-clearing price will be and the profit of each firm will be Now suppose that Gillette (firm 1) is the Stackelberg leader, and that Schick (firm 2) is the follower. In Stackelberg equilibrium firm 1 will supply an output of units, firm 2 will supply , and the market-clearing price will be

Expert Solution

The market demand is

P = 95 - q1 - q2

Marginal Cost of firm 1 is

MC1 = 5

Hence, Total Cost of firm 1 is

C1 = 5.q1

Marginal Cost of firm 2 is

MC2 = 5

Hence, Total Cost of firm 2 is

C2 = 5.q2

? Under Cournot Duopoly,

• For firm 1,

Total Revenue is

R1 = P.q1 = (95 - q1 - q2).q1

or, R1 = 95.q1 - q1?????2 - q1.q2

Marginal Revenue is

MR1 = dR1/dq1

or, MR1 = 95 - 2.q1 - q2

At profit maximization,

MR1 = MC1

or, 95 - 2.q1 - q2 = 5

or, q1 = 45 - 0.5.q2.........RF1

This is reaction function of firm 1.

• Similarly for firm 2,

Total Revenue is

R2 = P.q2 = (95 - q1 - q2).q2

or, R2 = 95.q2 - q1.q2 - q2?????2

Marginal Revenue is

MR2 = dR2/dq2

or, MR2 = 95 - q1 - 2.q2

At profit maximization,

MR2 = MC2

or, 95 - q1 - 2.q2 = 5

or, q2 = 45 - 0.5.q1...........RF2

This is reaction function of firm 2.

Now, solving RF1 and RF2 reaction functions we get,

q1* = 30 and q2* = 30

Each firm will supply an output of 30 units.

Putting q1* = q2* = 30 in the market demand curve we get,

P* = 95 - q1* - q2* = 95 - 30 - 30

or, P* = $35

Market-clearing price will be $35.

Hence, the profit of each firm is

π = R - C

or, π = P.q - 5.q

or, π = 35×30 - 5×30

or, π = $900

Profit of each firm will be $900.

? Now, if firm 1 is the Stackelberg leader, them it will put reaction function of firm 2 (RF2) in his profit maximization problem. Hence,

Firm 1's Total Revenue is

R1 = P.q1

or, R1 = (95 - q1 - q2).q1

Putting q2 = 45 - 0.5.q1 we get,

R1 = (95 - q1 - 45 + 0.5.q1).q1

or, R1 = (50 - 0.5.q1).q1

or, R1 = 50.q1 - 0.52

Hence, Marginal Revenue is

MR1 = dR1/dq1

or, MR1 = 50 - q1

At profit maximization,

MR1 = MC1

or, 50 - q1 = 5

or, q1° = 45

Firm 1 will supply an output of 45 units.

Putting q1° = 45 in RF2 we get,

q2° = 45 - 0.5.q1° = 45 - 0.5×45

or, q2° = 22.5

Firm 2 will supply an output of 22.5 units.

Putting q1° = 45 and q2° = 22.5 in the market demand curve we get,

P° = 95 - q1° - q2° = 95 - 45 - 22.5

or, P° = $27.5

The market-clearing price will be $27.5.

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