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 Solving for dominant strategies and the Nash equilibrium Suppose Manuel and Poornima are playing a game in which both must simultaneously choose the action Left or Right

Economics Dec 06, 2020

 Solving for dominant strategies and the Nash equilibrium

Suppose Manuel and Poornima are playing a game in which both must simultaneously choose the action Left or Right. The payoff matrix that follows shows the payoff each person will earn as a function of both of their choices. For example, the lower-right cell shows that if Manuel chooses Right and Poornima chooses Right, Manuel will receive a payoff of 5 and Poornima will receive a payoff of 1.

  Poornima
Left Right
Manuel Left 44 67
Right 24 51

The only dominant strategy in this game is for------ to choose -------- .

The outcome reflecting the unique Nash equilibrium in this game is as follows: Manuel chooses-------- and Poornima chooses --------- .

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