(a) SINGAPORE:- The government of Singapore had few qualms about intervening to supplement market forces and bring about desired industrial change. Clearly tie size and malleability of the economy made control easier, but Singapore also developed institutions that made it possible. Singapore has been aptly described as a corporate state because the distinction between government and business-indeed between the political leadership and the bureaucracy-is murky. The first key to Singapore's industrial strategy was an accurate assessment of the country's nation.al resources, followed by clear industrial goals and an understanding of tie relationships and ingredients needed to achieve theni. Without capital, technology or entrepreneurs, Singapore put its industrialization squarely on tie shoulders of multinational corporations (MNCS) and foreign direct investment. To attract FDI, it invested heavily in education and technical skills and in the infrastructure that MNCs value. Where necessary, it used government-linked companies (CLCs) to push its development agenda, although tese GLCS were run on a commercial basis.

In addition to encouraging foreign investors, the government decided in the late 1970s to promote higher technology and highervalue-added industries. It instituted a high-wage policy in an attempt to move quickly out of traditional labor-intensive manufactures. Although this policy did stimulate investment in electronics, machinery, pharmaceuticals, and precision products, by 1985 Singapore experienced its first severe recession. Rather than nominally devalue th¿ currency, the government opted to decrease labor costs through a large reduction in employer contributions to the Central Provident Fund. The implicit 12 percent wage cut was possible because the union movement was alled witi the government and the political leadership. In effect, the government tried to position its labor force to be attractive to multinationals, adjusting its price, augmenting its skills, and tinkering with financial incentives to change its trade pattern and stay ahead of its competitors in East Asia.

SOUTH KOREA:- Korea pursued an industrial policy-that is, te comprehensive use of public instruments to industrialize-at least from the start of the Tmnird Republic under President Park Clung Hee. However, during the 1961-71 period this policy was sectorally neutral. Manufactured exports were promoted through a familiar range of policies, but the government was satisfied to capitalize on Korea's comparative advantage in labor-intensive manufactures. Begiruing in 1971, however, te government began a coordinated campaign, known as the Heavy and Chemical Industry (HCI) drive, to build up six designated industries. It increased protection and provided many incentives to certain firms whose actions were carefully controlled.

The most important measure was heavily subsidized credit. What distinguished hiis industrial intervention was not only its thoroughness but also its premirse that flrms in steel, shipbuilding, machinery, electronics, petrochemicals, and metals would achieve intemationally competitive levels within a decade. In this respect, Korean intervention differed from the policy pronouncements in Brazil or India and many other import-substituting countries. Success was measured by export performance, and eventually all subsidies were expected to be withdrawn. The nature of the policy is dear, although it has at various times been judged both a failure and a success. For our purposes, it is enough to say that Korea did alter its industrial structure dramatically, and in most of te targeted industries it succeeded in pernetrating international markets. The issue, however, is not whether technical efficiency was achieved, but whether it was achieved profitably.

TAIWAN:- A glance at the history of Taiwan, China, could suggest that the country's initial conditions-the econonútic infrastructure from Japanese colonialism, entrepreneurial talent from mainland China, and U.S. aid-were unique. But its rapid industrialization owed mucI} more to domestic policies.23 In addition to te early success of land reform in bringing about reínarkable equity of income and wealth, policies for macroeconomic stability, domestic investments, and industrial development were highly effective.

After the import substitution phase of 1953-57, the government promoted exports during te peñiod 1958-72. lt gradually reduced import protection ard offset anti-export bias by providing free trade status and other incentives fbr exporters. It also set export targets and supported the development of labor-intensive industries. Economic growth between 1963 and 1972 averaged nearly 12 percent a year. For various economic and political reasons, te 1970s saw the emergence of a more self-reliant strategy with large investments in infra- 20 LESSONS OF EAST ASIA structure, industrial upgrading, and further import substitution. Public enterprises were used as a means of industrial policy, especially for a big push in heavy and chemical industries. Some of these state enterprises-for example, China Steel Corporation-perforned remarkably well by any standard, but many were outright failures. Economic performance, although robust overail, revealed strains, especially in competitiveness. In the 1980s, the policy switched to place a greater emphasis on liberalization and export development. The results were striking. The economy generated massive payment surpluses and the means to invest elsewhere in the region on a scale rivaling that of Japan.

HONGKONG:- Hong Kong embarked on its export drive in the early 1950s, a decade before tie other early NIES. It has always been different from the other three, particularly in the small and noninterventionist role of its govrernment For most of the past forty years, Hong Kong's economic growth and productivity grwth were the highest in the region. Industrialization was initiated by migrant industrialists, largely from Shanghai, but was fostered by local merchant entrepreneurs. Small enterprises flourished, supported by a government dedicated to stability and "positive nonintervention.".

Hong Kong's continued prosperity in the past dozen years has been built on the links with southern mainland China-and vice versa. During this period China doabled its average income faster than atty other country on record. The growth of Guangdong province, which is adjacent to Hong Kong and where millions of migrant workers from other provinces come to work, has been phenomenal. Today the province aspires to be the fifth "'tiger," and it has achieved this through free market policies rather than state intervention.

According to me the policy adopted by other countries are partially applicable to HONGKONG. The success of Thailand, Hong Kong, and recently te coastal provinces of China show the merits of avoiding unbridled industrial activism. Countries entertaining an activist industrial policy need to weigh both the risks and the potential gains of this gamble.

(B) Subcontracting network negatively affected the development of Hong Kong's manufacturing sector in many ways

Problems of subcontractors :-The structure of subcontractors is usually simple and small in size. They had neither time nor inclination to keep abreast with legal requirements or technological developments in safety. Shaw (1998) found that small business faced with specific health and safety challenge, many firms lack of adequate resources and were often struggling to survive. Furthermore, they lack an understanding of their obligations and the health and safety issues of their processes. Poon (1998) commented that the major cause of accident was that subcontractors were rewarded according to work done. They were working under tremendous time constraint, which caused higher possibility of construction accidents.

The multi-layers subcontracting practice was considered as one of the major reasons for poor safety performance. The interviewees explained that subcontractors are normally small in size and simple in structure. They usually lack safety commitment because of limited budget, time and human resources. It resulted in insufficient provision of on-the-job safety training to the employees, who have very limited knowledge to deal with safety matters. Subcontractors would rarely employ safety professional and they had no interest in safety matters because most of them believed that safety should be the responsibilities of the principal contractors. It could be explained by the fact that in Hong Kong subcontractors are usually not accountable for serious accident or for violation of safety regulations. Principal contractors would usually be responsible for 232 workmen compensation and penalized for safety offenses.

Perception of the Industry:- Most of the respondents agreed that multi-layers subcontracting practice is one of the major causes of poor safety performance and the performance of subcontractors is difficult to control. Reduction of subcontracting could help improve the safety performance of the construction industry. However, the multi-layers subcontracting practice has been widely adopted by the industry, majorities of the respondents believed that restriction of this practice is impracticable. It is because a great impact to the local construction industry was expected as well as the free market approach by Hong Kong would be damaged. Whether restricting the multi-layers subcontracting practice is the best solution for improving the safety.

(c)

Hong Kong is the best business choice for entrepreneurs who want to have access to the Asian market and Mainland China. Hong Kong is a very dynamic city and an increasingly important business hub and economic center that has expanded formidably in recent years. Hong Kong is an internationally renowned business location and is evolving towards competing with other important cities, like London or New York.

Hong Kong has been rated as one of the most tax-friendly economies in the world in 2014. This is very true, since the city only has three main direct taxes. The property tax and the salaries tax are set at 15 percent and the profits tax is set at 16.5 percent. Hong Kong has no sales tax, no withholding tax, capital gains tax or dividends tax.

In order to improve its trading relationships and offer international companies an even more advantageous taxation regime, Hong Kong has signed approximately 30 double taxation agreements and many more agreements are currently pending. Foreign branches and subsidiaries in Hong Kong can benefit from these agreements concluded in order to avoid double taxation.

Another important reason why investors choose to open a company in Hong Kong is because the government supports new businesses and new companies in Hong Kong. There are a number of programmes that help small and medium sized enterprises set up and begin their economic activities in the city. Some examples include incubator programmes, loan guarantees and funds for marketing.

Hong Kong not only has a tax friendly economy but it is also a city that welcomes foreign businesses. The city has free market policies, enjoys political stability and encourages an international business environment.

Because trade is very important for Hong Kong, the city has always encouraged a free market and a free trade policy. There are virtually no barriers to trade: no tariffs, quotas or exceptions there are no restrictions on inward and outward investments and no foreign exchange controls. Also, foreign investors have no restrictions regarding nationality when it comes to corporate ownership.

Hong Kong’s policies, work ethics and lifestyle attract business owners and employees alike. The vibrant city is a strategic location in Asia that offers world-class solutions for business. If you want to open a company in Hong Kong, our experts can help you get started.