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Homework answers / question archive / Model Output by Firm Industry Quantity Profits By Firm Industry Profits Price Cournot QFirm1 = ? Market output = ? units πFirm1 = ? Industry Profits = ? QFirm2 = ? πFirm2 = ? Stackelberg QLeader = ? Market output = ? Units πLeader = ? Industry Profits = ? QFollower = ? πFollower = ? Bertrand Market output = ? Units Industry Profits = ? Collusion [Duopoly] QFirm1 = ? Market output = ? units πFirm1 = ? Industry Profits = ? QFirm2 = ? πFirm2 = ? Two firms compete in a market to sell a homogeneous product with inverse demand function P = 600 − 3Q
Model | Output by Firm | Industry Quantity | Profits By Firm | Industry Profits | Price |
Cournot | QFirm1 = ? | Market output = ? units | πFirm1 = ? | Industry Profits = ? | |
QFirm2 = ? | πFirm2 = ? | ||||
Stackelberg | QLeader = ? | Market output = ? Units | πLeader = ? | Industry Profits = ? | |
QFollower = ? | πFollower = ? | ||||
Bertrand | Market output = ? Units | Industry Profits = ? | |||
Collusion [Duopoly] |
QFirm1 = ? | Market output = ? units | πFirm1 = ? | Industry Profits = ? | |
QFirm2 = ? | πFirm2 = ? |
Two firms compete in a market to sell a homogeneous product with inverse demand
function P = 600 − 3Q. Each firm produces at a constant marginal cost of $300 and has no fixed costs. Use this information to compare the output levels and profits in settings characterized by Cournot, Stackelberg, Bertrand, and collusive behavior.
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