1) Using iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies (IESDS)

one can definitely find a pure strategy Nash equilibrium if one of the players has a dominated strategy? T/F


2) In a two-player static game, if one player has a dominant strategy -
Group of answer choices
There will be a unique a pure strategy Nash equilibrium when other player also has a dominant strategy
There must be a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
There can be multiple pure strategy Nash equilibria.
All of the above.


3) It is never possible to transform a normal form game into an extensive form game.? T/F


4) Inverse market demand function: ?=240−?, where Q=q1+q2
Both firms have the same cost function: C = 300 + q i 2
The NE of the above Cournot game is:
Group of answer choices
(q1=72, q2=72)
(q1=36, q2=36)
(q1=32, q2=32)
(q1=24, q2=24)
(q1=48, q2=48)


5) Inverse market demand function: ?=240−?, where Q=q1+q2
Both firms have the same cost function: C = 300 + q i 2
The market price in this market will be $____


6) Inverse market demand function: ?=120−?, where Q=q1+q2
Both firms have the same cost function: C = 300 + q i 2
The market price in this market will be $____