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Homework answers / question archive / First Order Metaethical Principles: Boylan’s Philosophical Work on Ethics and Personhood Theory Introduction We begin our express voyage into ethical theory with an examination of first order ethical principles as set out by this author

First Order Metaethical Principles: Boylan’s Philosophical Work on Ethics and Personhood Theory Introduction We begin our express voyage into ethical theory with an examination of first order ethical principles as set out by this author

Philosophy

First Order Metaethical Principles: Boylan’s Philosophical Work on Ethics and Personhood Theory Introduction We begin our express voyage into ethical theory with an examination of first order ethical principles as set out by this author. As mentioned earlier, there are two forms of metaethics: first and second order. In the first order the author sets out intellectual presuppositions that are necessary in order to structure some normative theory. These principles can apply to any of the realistic, naturalistic theories that are set out in the subsequent chapters: virtue ethics, utilitarianism, and deontology. The anti-realistic theories set out that my definition of ethics: the science of the right and wrong in human action, is wrong. These authors do not think ethics is a “science” at all. A science looks at the world and discovers facts about how it operates. These facts are separate from the practitioner. The anti-realist believes that ethics is conventional and that individuals and communities impose these random commands upon their members just because they can. The sources of this justification are various. Let’s quickly look at three. First is ethical intuitionism. Ethical intuitionism is an approach to ethics that espouses to rely upon an immediate grasping of ethical truths. According to proponents, certain ethical responses are hard-wired into the human consciousness. Whether the cause of this hard-wiring is evolution or divine modeling (or both), it is not measurable and therefore cannot count as a fact about the world. Ethical intuitionism may be the most prevalent approach to ethics in the world. This is because of its mode of transmission: adages. These moral maxims are passed down from parents and grandparents in the form of pithy slogans. Sometimes these pithy slogans contradict each other such as “Look before you leap” and “Faint heart never won fair maiden.” In these cases intuition alone picks the one that is cogent to the situation at hand. In other situations it is up to the practitioner to pick out one or more adages that are relevant to the present problem. It is also possible for the practitioner to create a novel response invented by herself. The principal advantage of this approach is that it is easy to apply and easy to pass on to others (such as one’s children). The downside is that there is no intersubjective objective data through © Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2017 M. Boylan, Teaching Ethics with Three Philosophical Novels, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-55711-3_1 3 4 1 First Order Metaethical Principles: Boylan’s Philosophical Work on Ethics… which a discussion might be enjoined in cases of disagreement. Whenever this is the result in normative instances, violence or force is the deciding factor. So unless one is a kraterist (an advocate of “might makes right”), ethical intuitionism has severe drawbacks. Second is ethical contractarianism.1 Under this approach whatever people agree to is ethical because of the agreement. Obviously, this biases toward individual and group autonomy as the highest Whatever is the result of free exchange among parties is all right. There are, of course, many instances in which consent is adequate for going forward. For example, if one goes to the doctor and there is a surgical procedure, then the physician solicits an informed consent form in order to proceed. This is an instance of consent within the agency realm of the individual only. When we expand the purview, Consent (with a capital “C”) it is unclear how agency is decisive to normativity at all.2 This realm of Consent affects communities of all sizes. This is because the group can be skewed in its outlook—such as a majority population discriminating against a minority population. The fact that the members of the majority population agree to this arrangement is not decisive—even if some members of the minority population go along with it.3 People may also agree to conditions because they do not have adequate information and do not perform due diligence. Finally, there is the situation in which actors consent to actions that most moral codes would find offensive (as defined by those normative ethical theories).4 Certainly, autonomy is a capacity that all would endorse, and its exhibition in interpersonal interactions via consent should be supported. However, it is not clear whether this transfers over to Consent as a justification for ethics. This author is dubious. Third is ethical non-cognitivism. This is a very popular form of normative ethics that is supported principally by those interested in linguistics, psychology, sociology, and anthropology. This social science interest in non-cognitivism has to do with the general approach within the social sciences with the environmental effect of social institutions and apparatus upon the pliable human agent. For example, on the linguistic side, some would venture toward linguistic determinism in which the adoption of a language (and all that entails) reveals common normative bias. Then, on the social side, there is the effect of nurture via culture. This may be revealed via normal social analysis and may again bring in language (as a measure of behavior). A prominent proponent of this position is John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971). 2 I have written about this in more detail in: “Justification in Morality and the Law” in Ethical Rationalism and the Law, ed. Patrick Capps and Shaun Pattinson (London: Hart Publishing, 2016): 73–90. 3 Compare to Hegel’s “master-slave dialectic” in The Phenomenology of Mind, tr. J. B. Baillie (London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1931): 228–240. 4 Michael Boylan, Basic Ethics (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 2009):, n 78, 10–11, I cite the case of Wolf Sullowald, a former butcher who enters into a con-tract (consent) with an Austrian to be killed on an Internet site, butchered, and eaten. By all accounts the arrangement was agreeable to both sides—and there were witnesses. This is an extreme example of the defects in contractarianism as the foundation of ethical theory since it conflates consent with Consent. 1 Boylan’s First-Order Metaethical Principles 5 Finally, psychology comes in as a way of expression emotions: we create normative value on issues that we personally are interested in promoting. In all its forms ethical non-cognitivism is the most complex form of moral anti-realism. Because its language is social science and because social science has some basis in empiricism, this form of anti-realism is very compelling to those who (by disposition) are opposed to moral realism. And in the end there is no way to prove either the realists or the anti-realists to be right in a way that is non-question begging for all.5 In contrast to the anti-realistic ethical position, realistic theories will be those accounts which set out that there are moral facts that are true or false. Anti-realistic theories assert that ethical theories are not about moral facts, but rather are expressions of emotion, or cultural conditioning, or artifacts of linguistic expression, or agreements entered upon by a group of people for particular purposes—such as laws. In each of these anti-realistic arrangements there are no facts that are true or false, but rather conventions that vary from time to time and from place to place. Under these accounts ethics is really a subject of anthropology and sociology: descriptive in its origin. Prescriptive power comes from social sanction and police departments only. Naturalism refers to those realists who believe that the facts that they endorse exist in the natural world and can be discovered by people. Non-naturalists believe that the facts are not of this world, but of some other domain. Some ethicists and some religious moralists hold this position.6 This short text will take the position of realistic naturalism. It will examine first some first order ethical principles as set out by this author in his own writings and then it will present three primary readings from three prominent philosophers: Aristotle, Kant, and Mill. In the end there are some pedagogical apparatus to tie the textbook to the novels in the form of written assignments that fall in line with this approach. Boylan’s First-Order Metaethical Principles For our purposes the extent of the first order ethical principles will be: (a) the personal worldview imperative, (b) the shared community worldview imperative (and other community worldview imperatives), (c) the argument for the moral status of basic goods, and (d) the table of embeddedness. These are not exhaustive, but they will serve our purposes here.7 This is what I call the rationality incompleteness conjecture: See Michael Boylan, The Good, The True, and The Beautiful (London: Bloomsbury, 2008): 210. 6 A prominent advocate of this position is G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1903). Moore argues that “good” a key concept in ethics is a non-natural property. 7 For a more complete survey see my monographs: Michael Boylan, A Just Society (New York and Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004) and Natural Human Rights: A Theory (New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014). 5 6 1 First Order Metaethical Principles: Boylan’s Philosophical Work on Ethics… The Personal Worldview Imperative The personal worldview imperative is: “All people must develop a single comprehensive and internally coherent worldview that is good and that we strive to act out in our daily lives.” There are four parts to the personal worldview imperative: completeness, coherence, connection to a theory of the good, and practicality. Let’s briefly say something about each. First is completeness. Completeness refers to the ability of a theory or ethical system to handle all cases put before it and to determine an answer based upon the system’s recommendations. This is functionally achieved via the creation of a good will. The good will is a mechanism by which we decide how to act in the world. The good will provides completeness to everyone who develops one. There are two senses of the good will. The first is the rational good will, which means that each agent will develop an understanding about what reason requires of us as we go about our business in the world. Completeness means that reason (governed by the personal worldview and its operational ethical standpoint) should always be able to come up with an answer to a difficult life decision. In the case of ethics, the rational good will requires engaging in a rationally-based philosophical ethics and abiding by what reason demands. Often this plays out practically in examining and justifying various moral maxims—such as maxim alpha: “one has a moral responsibility to follow-through on one’s commitments, ceteris paribus.” This maxim is about promise making—call it maxim alpha. For example, one could imagine that an employer named Fred hired Olga on the basis of her résumé and a skype interview which did not reveal her mobility challenges (she needs a walker to get from points A to B for perambulation). Fred promises Olga the job but when she shows up to work Fred determines that Olga does not fit the image of the company that he wishes to exude: vibrant, athletic, and potent. A person in a walker is discordant to this image. Even though the job is a desk job (sitting in a cubicle), Fred wants to fire Olga. What should Fred do? The rational good will (as Fred, himself, has developed it via maxim alpha) says that Fred should carry through with his promise to Olga since there is no conflicting moral issue that would invoke the ceteris paribus clause in the maxim. For Fred to act otherwise would be an instance of denying completeness based upon the rational good will. Fred should keep his promise to Olga and let her work for him. Another sort of goodwill is the affective or emotional good will. We are more than just rational machines. We have an affective nature, too. Our feelings are important, but just as was the case with reason, some guidelines are in order. For the emotional good will we begin with sympathy. Sympathy will be taken to be the emotional connection that one forms with other humans. This emotional connection must be one in which the parties are considered to be on a level basis. The sort of emotional connection I am talking about is open and between equals. It is not that of a superior “feeling sorry” for an inferior. Those who engage in interactive human sympathy that is open and level will respond to another with care. Care is an actionguiding response that gives moral motivation to assisting another in need. Together sympathy, openness, and care constitute love. Boylan’s First-Order Metaethical Principles 7 In the above case on promise-making Fred wouldn’t be about making and justifying moral maxims such as maxim-alpha. Instead, Fred would be developing his capacity sympathetically to connect with other people—call this maxim-beta. If Fred sympathetically connected with Olga as a person and her capabilities as a job applicant that met the functions required in the job, then her disability that has nothing to do with her qualifications to carry out the job as advertised. His caring response would guide him toward maintaining his promise to Olga because to do otherwise would sever the sympathetic connection. Fred would not be acting like a loving person to do otherwise. The shared community worldview of vibrant, athletic, and potent need not be compromised because these are basically characteristics of the human spirit and not of the physical body. Olga can do her desk job with joie de vivre that reflects the company’s shared community worldview. Thus Fred acting on maxim-beta should refrain from firing Olga. Thus the two sorts of good will (affective and rational—set out via maxims alpha and beta) work together to promote keeping Olga on the job so long as she can do the work—disability should not be a factor here.8 When confronted with any novel situation one should utilize the two dimensions of the good will to generate a response. Because these two orientations act differently it is possible that they may contradict each other. When this is the case, I would allot the tiebreaker to reason. Others demur.9 Each reader should consider her own response to such an occurrence. A second part of the personal worldview imperative is coherence. People should have coherent worldviews. This also has two varieties: deductive and inductive. Deductive coherence speaks to our not having overt contradictions in our worldview. An example of an overt contradiction in one’s worldview would be for Sasha to tell her friend Sharad that she has no prejudice against Latinos and yet in another context she tells jokes about Latinos. The coherence provision of the personal worldview imperative says that you shouldn’t change who you are and what you stand for depending upon the context in which you happen to be: you should either support people with disabilities or excoriate them: waffling between the two is incoherent. Inductive coherence is different. It is about adopting different life strategies that work against each other. In inductive logic a conflicting strategy is called a sure-loss Since the affective goodwill comes from the completeness condition of the Personal Worldview Imperative, the conditions of the imperative also apply to this sort of philosophical love that I have set out. Some detractors think that you cannot order love (as I have done). I give a response to this argument in Michael Boylan, “Duties to Children” in Michael Boylan, ed. The Morality and Global Justice Reader (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2011): 385–404. 9 This is particularly true of some feminist ethicists. See Rosemarie Tong, “A Feminist Personal Worldview Imperative” in Morality and Justice: Reading Boylan’s A Just Society, ed. John-Stewart Gordon (Lanham, MD and Oxford: Lexington/Rowman and Littlefield, 2009): 29–38. 8 8 1 First Order Metaethical Principles: Boylan’s Philosophical Work on Ethics… contract.10 For example, if a person wanted to be a devoted husband and family man and yet also engaged in extramarital affairs he would involve himself in inductive incoherence. The very traits that make him a good family man: loyalty, keeping your word, sincere interest in the well-being of others would hurt one in being a philanderer, which requires selfish manipulation of others for one’s own pleasure. The good family man will be a bad philanderer and vice versa. To try to do both well involves a sure-loss contract. Such an individual will fail at both. This is what inductive incoherence means. From the point of view of a disabled person this second form of coherence involves a self-assessment of what can and cannot be done: to seek for both will lead to a sure-loss contract. This creates a reality of the possible in which the disabled person can try to find self-fulfillment (see below under health). Third is connection to a theory of the good—most prominent being ethics.11 The personal worldview imperative enjoins that we consider and adopt an ethical theory.12 It does not give us direction, as such, to which theory to choose except that the chosen theory must not violate any of the other three conditions (completeness, coherence, and practicability). What is demanded is that we connect to a theory of ethics and use it to guide our actions. The final criterion is practicability. It is important that the demands of ethics and social/political philosophy (including human rights) be doable and its goals be attainable. This is especially important to consider when one is not in the position of the most advantaged. To be most advantaged is to be in the groups in society that are afforded privilege. This generally means that they possess traits of the ruling group including: race, gender, religion, national origin, and the right mix of mental and physical capabilities. To be in this group is to be granted an undeserved benefit from the start. Those who do not meet the criteria afforded by privilege are excluded from the most advantaged group. For example, one category that is not in the most advantaged genus are those with a disability. One must accept the body one is in at the moment and consider what is possible. This does not mean to “settle” for something less. But it also does not mean that one should hang upon scientifically unwarranted dreams of having one’s disability reversed. A utopian command may have logically valid arguments behind it but also be existentially unsound—meaning that some of the premises in the action-guiding argument are untrue by virtue of their being unrealizable in practical terms. If, in a theory of global ethics, for example, we required that everyone in a rich country gave up three-quarters of their income so that they might support the legitimate plight of the poor, then this would be a utopian vision. The phrase “sure loss contract” comes from the notion of betting houses. Say you were betting on the finals of the World Cup: Brazil v. Germany. If you gave 5-1 positive odds for each team, then your betting house will go out of business. A positive assessment of one team requires a complementary negative assessment of the other: failure to observe this rule results in a sure loss contract. 11 Other aspects of the good can include commitments to aesthetics and to religion. 12 My take on the various real and anti-real theories is generally set out in my text, Basic Ethics 2009: Part two. 10 Boylan’s First-Order Metaethical Principles 9 Philosophers are all too often attracted to tidy, if perhaps radical, utopian visions. However, unless philosophers want to be marginalized, we must situate our prescriptions in terms that can actually be used by policymakers. Philosophers involved in human rights discourse must remember that these theories are to apply to real people living in the world. In taxation policy, for example, at some point—let’s say at the point of a 50% income-tax rate—even the very wealthy among us will feel unjustly burdened and will rebel and refuse to comply with the policy. Thus it is utopian to base a policy upon the expectation that the rich will submit to giving up 75% of their income. An aspirational goal (by contrast) is one that may be hard to reach but is at least possible to achieve (it does not violate principles of human nature or structural facts about the communities that inhabit the world). For the purposes of this essay, the aspirational perspective will be chosen over the utopian. The purview of the personal worldview imperative is the individual as she interacts with other individuals in the world. Each of us has to do as much as possible to take stock of who we are and what we realistically think we can and should be. Our personal consciousness is in our power to change. Though factors of environment and genetics are not to be dismissed, in the end it is the free operation of our will that allows us to confront the personal worldview imperative as a challenge for personal renewal. The acceptance of the personal worldview account means that it is in our power to create our ethical selves. This is the component of personal agency that drives my entire metaethical and normative ethical project. The personal worldview imperative thus grounds my theory of personhood that is part of the foundation of natural human rights. The Shared Community Worldview Imperatives The community is a second important focus in our presentation of crucial first order metaethical concepts. This sensibility requires that we understand that each person lives within a context. Sometimes, especially in the United States, there is a mythology that we live all by ourselves and that others are just meaningless noise. I have called this attitude about social interaction: egg carton community.13 In an egg carton no egg should touch another egg. The idea behind this is that when eggs touch other eggs, bad things happen! Many people—especially in wealthy countries among the wealthy—hold this to be true. They adopt libertarian attitudes about others, i.e., that only negative duties hold because each person is only responsible for himself and the direct harm he may have caused another. Such a position can be term the negative duty position. In negative duties one is only responsible for rectifying harm that he, himself, has caused. If he didn’t do the deed, then no obligation falls upon him. Behind the libertarian worldview is the sensibility that the natural unit of existence is of an individual existing by himself. All social interactions are part of a non-essential environmental milieu in which we are placed—much like fish are 13 Michael Boylan (2004): 115–116. 10 1 First Order Metaethical Principles: Boylan’s Philosophical Work on Ethics… X__________________________Y_________________________Z Extreme individualism Balanced approach Extreme Communitarian Fig. 1.1 The ontological range of who we are placed in water. The water is an aspect of existence but only as a trivial background condition. Against this position is the community perspective. It asserts that we are actual members of communities and these are essential factors that must be acknowledged. Now before going further I should set out that just as there are extremists in the individual perspective, that there are extremists in the community perspectives. Some extreme communitarians believe that the community is everything. Some sociologists and anthropologists fit into this position. I would suggest a stance that is mid-way between these extremes (Fig. 1.1): Under my approach, both the individual, by herself, and the individual as a member of community must be acknowledged. The Personal Worldview Imperative, is my response to the former and the shared community worldview imperatives will be my responsive to the various social and natural contexts in which we live. Let us begin with the first of these: the shared community worldview imperative, “Each agent must contribute to a common body of knowledge that supports the creation of a shared community worldview (that is itself complete, coherent, and good) through which social institutions and their resulting policies might flourish within the constraints of the essential core commonly held values (ethics, aesthetics, and religion).” There are four aspects of this imperative: (a) participation, (b) common body of knowledge, (c) creation of social institutions, and (d) diversity. Let’s address these in order. First is the requirement for participation. Communities only work well when everyone participates. Now the level of participation varies according to the community size. In micro communities (2–500) one may know most of the community members. Because of the small size, considerable involvement is necessary. For example, in church pot-luck supper you may be required to make a dish and share with others. Or in a neighborhood “community watch program” in which neighborhoods that are high crime the residents take turns in keeping an eye on the community. These programs are very effective, but they require high participation among community members. In macro communities (501+) one’s participation is generally indirect. There are representatives of factions of the community and they solicit participation according to a hierarchical formation. In these instances one may not see directly the outcomes of her work, but it is asserted to be a cooperative effort on behalf of the whole. The metaphor of the beehive is often used here. But in either case, participation in the community is necessary under this imperative. Those who do not are termed free riders who want reward for being in the community, but do not want to do their share. This is a metaphorical form of theft: you want to take without doing the work that is required of all. Whenever one takes Boylan’s First-Order Metaethical Principles 11 without fulfilling the job description that is requisite (in this case being an active community member), he is involved in a form of theft. The Common Body of Knowledge The common body of knowledge within a community is the generally regarded facts and values about what is true. There are, of course, many communities that set out various opinions about the facts of the world. For example, in the United States there are many who disagree with the almost unanimous opinion of scientists that the world temperatures are rising and the cause of this is human activity (such as carbon emission motor cars, power plants, and manufacturing fabrication.14 How can this controversy be resolved? It would seem to this author that there be some commitment to becoming aware of the science. If the science is set out in a too complicated manner, then find a trusted party who can talk to the parties about this. The facts are the facts. We must not politicize them. The Creation of Social Institutions Societies depend upon institutions for their operation. These institutions maybe formal or informal. Formal institutions are recognized by the society via some legal structure, such as licensing. There are many forms of license: incorporation, foundation status, non-profits, et al. Penalties for non-compliance are within the legal system. Informal institutions are not recognized via the legal system but rather through social recognition. The penalties for non-compliance are outside the legal system and restricted to social sanctions (shunning and the like). The point to be made here is that all members of the community are responsible for monitoring their social institutions so that they fulfill a mission that does not violate that portion of the personal worldview imperative calling for “connection to the good.” In the U.S., the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s sought to reform both the formal and informal institutions (de jure and de facto) that supported racist segregation. In this case members of the community came forward to reform institutions. This is what the shared community worldview imperative commands. Diversity is a critical component in the shared community imperative. Because the imperative recognizes that there are at least three sources of community normativity (subject to conditions of the personal worldview imperative) there will be various expressions of what it means to be good among micro communities within the macro community. So long as these various expressions do not violate the personal worldview imperative, they are permitted. It is the position of this author that diversity breeds excellence. Communities that encourage diversity will outperform those who seek to suppress it. Throughout human history—all over the world— many to most macro communities do not embrace diversity but fall into zenophobic tribalism as they seek to disenfranchise the other. The shared community worldview imperative is a statement against the dream of homogeneity and a call for conscious heterogeneity. For a lighthearted take on this serious problem see: Michael Mann and Tom Toles, The Madhouse Effect: How Climate Change Denial is Threatening our Planet, Destroying our Politics, and Driving us Crazy (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016). 14 12 1 First Order Metaethical Principles: Boylan’s Philosophical Work on Ethics… Extended Community Worldview Imperative Each agent must educate himself as much as he is able about the peoples of the world— their access to the basic goods of agency, their essential commonly held cultural values, and their governmental and institutional structures—in order that he might individually and collectively accept the duties that ensue from those peoples’ legitimate rights claims, and to act accordingly within what is aspirationally possible. This form of the shared community worldview imperative extends to communities that are physically apart from the community in which one lives (either micro or macro). It asserts a principle of cosmopolitanism. Now, the same individuals who demur about the provision of diversity within the shared community worldview imperative because of xenophobic tribalism will be leery of helping those who may be half-way around the world away. But since the argument for the moral status of basic goods, below, makes no mention of being geographically close or within the same nation, this author is committed to the cosmopolitan position when it comes to providing others the basic goods of agency (see the table of embeddedness, below). Now it is difficult for many to feel committed to helping others who are geographically detached from us. These dynamics have been set out by Peter Unger.15 My response has been to support Unger’s aim that we should accept the positive duties that come from suffering peoples throughout the world.16 Eco Community Worldview Imperative Each agent must educate herself about the proximate natural world in which she lives relating to her agency within this eco-system: (a) what her natural place in this order is vis-à-vis her personal agency; (b) how her natural place (vis-à-vis her personal agency) may have changed in recent history; (c) how her social community’s activities have altered the constitution of the natural order and how this has effected community agency; (d) the short-term and long-term effects of those changes vis-à-vis agency; and (e) what needs to be done to maintain the natural order in the short and long term so that the ecosystem might remain vibrant. This imperative extends the way we think about community. In the first two community worldview imperatives the communities were human collections in contiguous micro and macro groupings and non-contiguous groupings. Now, we are asked to consider the natural world in which we live as being a part of our community consciousness. The emphasis is still upon agency. What this imperative sets out is that the natural element of our habitat is a vital consideration that should not be dismissed. Now at the writing of this book there are many who do not take their environment seriously. According to my take on things, they do not fully understand the role of nature in peoples’ lives. If one lives in a place in the world in which hurricanes or torrential rains are a regular occurrence, then these peoples will not dispute the Peter Unger, Living High and Letting Die (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996): chs. 1–2. Michael Boylan, Morality and Global Justice: Justifications and Applications (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2011): 25–27, cf. ch. 7. 15 16 Boylan’s First-Order Metaethical Principles 13 powerful role of nature. If one were living in the far north of Canada which has just opened up the long-fabled Northwest Passage for passenger vessels and commercial vessels due to the melting of artic ice, then one would be forced to recognize the effects upon lives—especially indigenous peoples of these regions. Now, it is often the case that those who live in “climate-controlled luxury” might be numb to these realities, but they are there nonetheless. The eco-community worldview imperative speaks to the ecosystem in which one lives. But that’s not all there is. Extended Eco Community Worldview Imperative Each agent must educate herself about the world’s biomes: freshwater, saltwater, arid regions, forests, prairies & grassland, tundra, and artic regions. This education should be ongoing and should include how the relative stability and natural sustainability is faring at various points in time. This knowledge will entail a factual valuing that also leads to an aesthetic valuing. Since all people seek to protect what they value, this extended community membership will ground a duty to protect the global biomes according to what is aspirationally possible. To complete our embracing of the role of the natural world as a community in which we should show interest, is the extended eco-community worldview imperative. This is parallel to the extended community worldview imperative. In each case, there is no immediate, proximate effect upon us. But if we have accepted our status as citizens of the world, then disruption of the climate anywhere is of concern to all of us everywhere. When there is a smog climate inversion over Shanghai, it should concern people of London, New York, and Berlin (among others). This is because of the principle of connectivity that underlies all of these community worldview imperatives. The Argument for the Moral Status of Basic Goods The opening sentence of my 2004 book, A Just Society, states: “All people by nature desire to be good.” Just as in the opening statement of the Nicomachean Ethics,17 there are two senses of good to be understood here. First there is the prudential sense of the word. ‘Good’ here means “good for me.” This sense advances my egoistic interests. Under this understanding of ‘good’ it is almost tautological. Don’t we all act to produce a result that we think is useful to us? Who (except for the masochistic) act to bring about pain? Even then, the pain might be pleasurable in some contorted way. But, unlike Aristotle, premise one slants away from the merely prudential. It includes the sense of some end of an action being good for my best interests. If one were an ethical egoist, as Plato was,18 the two senses of ‘good’ dissolve See the first of the nine sections of the Aristotelian primary text pieces. The Ethical Egoist believes that acting ethically is really the path that is in our long term best interests. This is the principal argument of the Republic: even if we possess the Ring of Gyges we should act ethically. It is in our long term best interest. 17 18 14 1 First Order Metaethical Principles: Boylan’s Philosophical Work on Ethics… into one. My conjecture here is that all people want to act in order to fulfill what they think will be the best way for their life to follow. This leans toward Plato, here. If this accepted, then the possibility of voluntary human action becomes a definition of our human nature. This argument tries to examine the conditions of such action with the understanding that what is most primary to action (embedded) is most choice worthy. This analysis follows from a generic understanding of homo sapiens. Thus, it asserts general characteristics that will be applied later to individuals via the principle of logical application of a general covering law. “The Moral Status of Basic Goods” 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. All people, by nature, desire to be good—Fundamental Assumption In order to become good, one must be able to act—Fact All people, by nature, desire to act—1, 2 People value what is natural to them—Assertion What people value they wish to protect—Assertion All people wish to protect their ability to act—3–5 Fundamental interpersonal “oughts” are expressed via our highest value systems: morality, aesthetics, and religion—Assertion All people must agree, upon pain of logical contradiction, that what is natural and desirable to them individually is natural and desirable to everyone collectively and individually—Assertion Everyone must seek personal protection for her own ability to act via morality, aesthetics, and religion—6, 7 Everyone, upon pain of logical contradiction, must admit that all other humans will seek personal protection of his or her ability to act via morality, aesthetics, and religion—8, 9 All people must agree, upon pain of logical contradiction, that since the attribution of the basic goods of agency are predicated generally, that it is inconsistent to assert idiosyncratic preference—Fact Goods that are claimed through generic predication apply equally to each agent and everyone has a stake in their protection—10, 11 Rights and duties are correlative—Assertion Everyone has at least a moral right to the basic goods of agency and others in the society have a duty to provide those goods to all—12, 13 At this point the reader might ask what are the goods of agency, and what is their hierarchy in a triage understanding geared toward the possibility of human action toward what people believe to be in their long term best interests? The answer to the question has several dimensions: biological, ethical, political, and economic. I have tried to address all of these concerns in a hierarchical setting of what goods allow us to act. The biological goods are necessary because without them we die (or are severely compromised as biological beings) and cannot act. These are the level-one Basic Goods. Because these goods affect the very possibility of biological agency they are the most embedded. Boylan’s First-Order Metaethical Principles 15 Next are the liberty rights, education rights, and the protection of one’s human dignity. These are also fundamental. However, they are not as fundamental as being able to biologically act. Thus they are level-two Basic Goods. The Secondary Goods begin with goods associated with the shared community worldview at the micro and macro levels. These are very important: equal opportunity to participate in the community—even if one is the other. However, these goods are not as essential as the level-two Basic Goods. It is at this point that governmental or institutional intervention can cease. Since level-two and level-three Secondary Goods are about economic achievement given a fair playing field, it is up to the agent here to fulfill what he or she is capable and relative to their abilities (given environmental conditions) and their work ethic. What follows is the Table of Embeddedness that sets out the triage of goods necessary for action (which is who we are: our human nature). The Table of Embeddedness Basic Goods Level One: Most Deeply Embedded (That which is absolutely necessary for Human Action): Food, Water (including sanitation), Clothing, Shelter, Protection from Unwarranted bodily harm (including basic health care) Level Two: Deeply Embedded (That which is necessary for effective basic action within any given society) • Literacy in the language of the country • Basic mathematical skills • Other fundamental skills necessary to be an effective agent in that country, e.g., in the United States some computer literacy is necessary • Some familiarity with the culture and history of the country in which one lives. • The assurance that those you interact with are not lying to promote their own interests. • The assurance that those you interact with will recognize your human dignity (as per above) and not exploit you as a means only. • Basic human rights such as those listed in the U.S. Bill of Rights and the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights Secondary Goods Level One: Life Enhancing, Medium to High-Medium on Embeddedness • Basic Societal Respect • Equal Opportunity to Compete for the Prudential Goods of Society • Ability to pursue a life plan according to the Personal Worldview Imperative • Ability to participate equally as an agent in the Shared Community Worldview Imperative Level Two: Useful, Medium to low Medium Embeddedness 16 1 First Order Metaethical Principles: Boylan’s Philosophical Work on Ethics… • Ability to utilize one’s real and portable property in the manner she chooses • Ability to gain from and exploit the consequences of one’s labor regardless of starting point • Ability to pursue goods that are generally owned by most citizens, e.g., in the United States today a telephone, television, and automobile would fit into this class. Level Three: Luxurious, Low Embeddedness • Ability to pursue goods that are pleasant even though they are far removed from action and from the expectations of most citizens within a given country, e.g., in the United States today a European Vacation would fit into this class • Ability to exert one’s will so that she might extract a disproportionate share of successful purposive agent. From my perspective this is a firm statement of human nature: We all desire to be able purposively to act toward ends that we believe to be good. If we accept the argument for the Moral Status of Basic Goods and the assessment of what these goods might be (the Table of Embeddedness) then there is a proven positive duty by everyone to provide these goods to those without.19 For example, take food. The United Nations has set out that the minimum calorie intake on a regular basis is 500 (given some variation for soma type).20 750 calories is better and 1000 calories is the aspirational goal. These nutritional needs allow the brain to operate in such a way that purposive action (toward that which we consider to be good) is possible. There are many reasons why some individual may not be successful at garnering level-one, level-two basic goods, and level-one secondary goods. These generally include socio-economic deprivation that describes one’s position in the community such that one’s ability to commit purposive action toward one’s conception of the good is restricted. One may be born into this state or descend there due to factors both in and not within one’s power. This essay will understand the word disability to refer to just such a state in which one does not have the positive liberty (or faces a negative liberty road block) to be able effectively to seek after these goods. Positive liberty will be taken to be the power one possesses to be able to effect purposive action that leads towards the ends that one believes are good (both prudentially and morally). The power is demonstrated in the activity of the agent as she seeks to move in the direction of realizing the desired end.21 Negative liberty will be taken to refer to barriers from either within the agent or without that prevents the agent from fulfilling what he desires to do. Examples of “within the agent” include physiological impairments (either mental, emotional, or Levels two and three of secondary goods are to be considered after the more embedded levels have been realized. 20 The 2007 Human Development Report (New York: United Nations Development Program, 2007): 27. 21 Many of the key distinctions I draw on liberty can be found in Isiah Berlin Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969). 19 Conclusion of the First-Order Metaethical Principles 17 in the operation of one’s muscular/skeletal system and its support systems22). Examples of “without” include environmental restraints either natural or social/ political. For example, if one were born with the ability to concentrate for a long period of time before acting, this might be an advantage if one were born into a hunting society where one had to have the patience to wait for game before making his move. However, if one were a Wall Street broker, that same characteristic would mean that you would be always short on the one critical trade for your clients. Is being deliberate and patient, by nature, an advantage or a disability? It all depends upon the environment whether it rewards or creates barriers for action. Conclusion of the First-Order Metaethical Principles So the first step in the process of entering into the realm of the normative theories of ethics is now complete. Other philosophers may disagree with some of these firstorder principles (that’s what philosophers do), but at least some of the major presuppositions necessary to think about normative ethical theories have been set out. What will follow is a transition author, Aristotle, who engages in some of these first-order metaethical points as he also lays down his own normative theory of ethics. Exercises 1. Go to the argument for the Moral Status of Basic Goods. Find two controversial premises. Give reasons why some people might support these controversial premises (pro) and then give reasons why some people might be against them (con). State your own position. 2. Examine the Table of Embeddedness: Basic Goods, levels one and two. Secondary Goods level one. Are there any goods that you would arrange differently? How do you justify your choice given that these are supposed to represent what is necessary to commit human purposive action in an hierarchal order? 3. Go to your favorite news source and try to find an instance nationally or internationally where a someone acted out of emotional good will (the completeness condition in the personal worldview imperative). 4. Go to your favorite news source and try to find an instance in which a community (society) is presently being injured due to the fact that the common body of knowledge is under attack (the so-called “post-truth” era). 5. You are a national legislator with some power. Your government is considering privatizing its health care system so that there are no firm guarantees for everyone. You are unclear about how you will vote. Lots of upper middle class and upper class individuals are tired of paying high taxes to support lower middle class and poor people. Use the Table of Embeddedness in helping you come to a decision. By support systems, I am referring to the major systems of the body such as the circulatory, nervous, and digestive systems. These systems allow the conditions for voluntary positive liberty. 22 2 Virtue Ethics with Selections from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle was the first systematic writer on ethical theory from the ancient Greek world. Today, we classify his general approach as virtue (arete) ethics or ethics of character. This approach is aimed more at creating good decision-makers rather than creating a decision theory mechanism which will allow anyone to plug in the relevant data and derive an action recommendation. The presupposition is this: people of good character make right choices. These spring out of their well-formed disposition so that they can merely appeal to their habits to act rightly. Aristotle also addresses a number of critical questions about ethics as applied broadly to the society at large. These include such disparate topics as: justice, culpability, and friendship. This presentation of Aristotle will concentrate upon nine critical presentations by Aristotle so that the reader might get a general sampling of his presentation.1 In each case I will present the conclusion of the argument first. This will offer a challenge to the reader that she will have to find the supporting material for that conclusion from the primary text translation provided. Argument 2.1 All deliberative/methodological actions are about normative goodness (Book One. Chapter 1 1094a 1-7) Every functionally-based art and every methodologically-based investigation and likewise each practical pursuit seems to aim at some good. Thus, the good is rightly said to be that to which all things aim. It is also true that within these ends concerning the arts and sciences there is a marked variety. Sometimes the end is the mere practicing of the art, itself. At others it is some end product that is separate from the practicing of the art. 1 The translation is a revision of W.D. Ross’s translation, Nicomachean Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1908). The Greek text I am following the text of J. Bywater, Ethica Nicomachea (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1894). © Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2017 M. Boylan, Teaching Ethics with Three Philosophical Novels, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-55711-3_2 19 20 2 Virtue Ethics with Selections from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics Argument 2.2 The human good is the soul actively and excellently expressing reason (Book One. Chapter 7, 1098a 8-17) If the function of humans is the active exercise of the rational soul’s according to rationality or at least not in dissociation from rational principles, and if we acknowledge the function of an individual and especially a good individual of the same class (for example, a harper and a good harper, and so with other classes) to be generally the same but differing in excellence (arete) in fulfilling the function (ergon) of his case. (I mean that the function, ergon, of a harper is to play the harp and that of a good harper is to play the harp excellently.) If this analysis is correct, then we declare the function of humans is a particular form of life and we define that form as the exercise of the capacities of the soul (psuche) in accord with reason. Argument 2.3 The noble man’s happiness does not fall easily away and, once diminished, does not easily return (Book One. Chapter 10, 1100b 22-1101a 7) Now many events happen by chance (tuche), and these events differ in magnitude. Small [25] pieces of good luck or of its opposite clearly do not alter one’s whole life one way or the other, yet a succession of great events if they turn out well will make life happier (since they themselves embellish one’s life, and the way they are utilized can reveal nobility and virtue), while great and frequent misfortunes will crush and disfigure happiness; for they both bring pain [30] with them and hinder many activities. Yet even in adversity nobility shines through, when a person bears with resignation repeated and severe misfortunes, not through insensibility to pain but through nobility and greatness of soul. If activities are, as we have said, what gives life its character, no supremely happy (makarios) individual can become miserable; for he will never do the acts that are hateful and [1101a] base. For the person who is truly good and wise, we think, bears all the chances of life in a seemly way and always makes the best of circumstances as a good general makes the most effective military use of the army at his command and a good shoemaker makes the finest shoes [5] out of the leather given him; and so with all other craftsmen and professions. And if this is the case, the happy man can never become miserable—though he will not reach blessedness (makarios), even if he meets with the bad luck (tuche) of Priam.2 Argument 2.4 Virtue is an active state that is achieved by rationally choosing the mean (Book Two, Chapter 5-6 1105b 20-1107a 8) Next we must consider what virtue (arete) is. Things that are found in the soul (psyche) are of three kinds: emotions (pathos), capacities (dunameis), or states (hexis), virtue must be one of these. By emotions I mean desire, anger, fear, confidence, envy, joy, love, hatred, longing, jealousy, pity, and in general whatever engenders pleasure or pain. Of course, Priam, King of Troy, was put into a bad situation when Paris, his son, took Helen (wife of Menelaus) to Troy. This started the Trojan War and resulted in Hector, Priam’s favorite son and likely successor, to be killed by Achilles and consequently the fall of his city. This is, indeed, an example of bad luck. 2 2 Virtue Ethics with Selections from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics 21 By capacities the things in virtue of which we are said to be capable of feeling these, e.g., [25] of becoming angry, or afraid, or feeling pity. By states the things in which we stand well or badly with reference to feelings, e.g., with reference to anger we stand badly if we feel it violently or too weakly, and well if we feel it moderately; and similarly with reference to the other passions. [30] Now neither the virtues nor the vices are emotions. This is because we are not called good or bad on the ground of our emotions. We are neither praised nor blamed for our emotions (for the man who feels fear or anger is not praised, nor is the man who simply feels anger [1106a] blamed, but only the man who feels it in a particular way). But we are praised or blamed for our virtues and our vices. Again, we don’t feel anger and fear from choice, but the virtues are modes of choice or [5] involve choice. Besides, in respect of the emotions we are said to be moved, but in respect of the virtues and vices we are said not to be moved but to be disposed [to move] in a particular way. For these reasons also they are not capacities either for we are neither called good nor bad, nor praised nor blamed, for the simple capacity of feeling the emotions. We have the capacities by nature, but we are not made good or bad by nature; we have spoken of this before.3 [10] If, then, the virtues are neither emotions nor capacities, all that remains is that they are states [of character]. Thus, we have stated what virtue is in respect of its genus. [15] CHAPTER 6. It is not enough merely to describe virtue as a state, but we must also say what sort of species the state is. We may say, then, that every virtue or excellence both (a) brings into good condition the thing of which it is the excellence and (b) makes the work of that thing be done well; e.g., the excellence of the eye makes both the eye and its work (ergon) good; [20] for it is by the excellence of the eye that we see well. Similarly the excellence of the horse makes a horse both good in itself [intrinsic] and good at running and at carrying its rider in the face of the enemy [extrinsic]. Therefore, if this is true in every case, the virtue of man also will be a state [of character] which makes a man good and which makes him perform his function well. [25] How this is to happen we have stated already,4 but it will be made plain also by the following consideration of the specific nature of virtue. In everything that is continuous and divisible it is possible to take a larger part, a smaller part, or an equal part, and that either in terms of the object itself or relative to us; and the equal is an intermediate between excess and deficiency. [30] By the intermediate in the object I mean that which is equidistant from each of the extremes, which is one and the same for everyone. But the intermediate relatively to us is that which is neither superfluous nor deficient—and this is not one, nor the same for all. For instance, if ten is many and two is few, six is the intermediate, taken in terms of the object; for it [35] exceeds and is exceeded by an equal amount [four units]; this is intermediate according to arithmetical proportion. But 3 4 1103a 18–b2. 1104a 11–27. 22 2 Virtue Ethics with Selections from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics the intermediate relatively to us is not to be taken so. If ten pounds [1106b] of food are too much for a particular person to eat and two too little, it does not follow that the trainer will order six pounds; for this also is perhaps too much for the person who is to [5] take it, or too little—too little for Milo5 too much for the beginner in athletic exercises. The same is true for running and wrestling. Thus, a master of any art avoids excess and defect, but seeks the intermediate and chooses this. The mean is thus not in the object but relative to us. This, then is how every science produces its work well—by looking to the mean and [10] judging its product by this standard (so that we often say of good products that it is not possible either to take away or to add anything, implying that excess and defect destroys the goodness of the product, while the mean preserves it. Good craftsmen, as we say, look to this in their work). Further, if virtue is more exact and better than any art, as nature also is, then virtue [15] must have the quality of aiming at the mean. By virtue I mean moral virtue; for it is this that is concerned with emotions and actions, and in these there is excess, defect, and the mean. For instance, one can feel fear and confidence or desire or anger or pity and experience pleasure and pain in general either too much and too [20] little, and in both these cases not well. But to feel these emotions at the right times, with reference to the right objects, towards the right people, with the right motive, and in the right way, is what is both intermediate and best, and this is characteristic of virtue. Similarly with regard to actions also there is excess, defect, and the mean. Now virtue is concerned with [25] emotions and actions, in which excess is a form of failure, and so is a defect, while the mean is praised and is a form of success; and being praised and being successful are both characteristics of virtue. Therefore, virtue is a kind of mean, since, as we have seen it aims at what is intermediate. [30] Again, there are many ways to err (since evil belongs to the class of the unlimited, as the Pythagoreans conjectured, and good to that of the limited), but there is only one way to be correct. This is why error is easy and rectitude difficult— to miss the mark is easy. To hit the mark is difficult. And for this reason, then, excess and defect are characteristic of vice and the mean characteristic of virtue. [35] “For men are good in but one way, but bad in many.”6 [1107a] Virtue, then is a state [of character] concerned with choice of actions, lying in a mean, i.e., a mean relative to us, this being determined by reference to reason, and by that principle by which the man of practical wisdom would determine it. Now it is a mean between two vices, that which depends on excess and that which depends on deficiency. It is a mean also for this reason because the vices respectively fall short of or exceed what [5] is right in both emotions and actions, while virtue finds and chooses that which is intermediate. Hence with respect to its substance and the definition which states its essence virtue is the thorough observance of a mean, with regard to what is best and right. 5 6 A famous wrestler. The source of this quotation is unknown. 2 Virtue Ethics with Selections from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics 23 Argument 2.5 Moral praise or blame can only be accorded to voluntary actions; involuntary actions due to force or ignorance of particulars occasioned by pain and regret mitigate blame{PRIVATE}. (Book Three, Chapter 1, 1109b 30-1111b 5) Virtue is concerned with passions and actions. Praise or blame are assessed on voluntary passions and actions. Those passions and actions that are involuntary deserve pardon, and sometimes also pity, to distinguish the voluntary and the involuntary. This distinction is necessary for those who are studying the nature of virtue, and useful also for legislators with a view to the assigning both of honors and of punishments. [35] Those things, then, are thought involuntary, which take place under compulsion or [1110a] owing to ignorance; and that is compulsory of which the moving principle is outside, being a principle in which nothing is contributed by the person who is acting or is feeling the passion, e.g., if he were to be carried somewhere by a wind, or by men who had him in their power. But with regard to the things that are done from fear of greater evils or for some noble [5] object (e.g., if a tyrant were to order one to do something base, having one’s parents and children in his power, and if one did the action they were to be saved, but otherwise would be put to death), it may be debated whether such actions are involuntary or voluntary. Something of this sort happens also with regard to the throwing of goods overboard in a storm; for in the [10] abstract no one throws goods away voluntarily, but only on condition of its securing the safety of himself and his crew. Such actions, then, are mixed, but are more like voluntary actions; for they are worthy of choice at the time when they are done, and the end of an action is relative to the occasion. Both the terms, then, ‘voluntary’ and ‘involuntary,’ must be used with [15] reference to the moment of action. Now the man acts voluntarily when the principle that moves the instrumental parts of the body in such actions is in him. Further, the things that constitute the moving principle are in a man himself are in his power to do or not to do. Such mixed actions, therefore, are voluntary but in the abstract perhaps involuntary; for no one would choose the act in itself [without the extenuating circumstances]. [20] For such actions man are sometimes even praised, when they endure something base or painful in return for great noble objects gained; in the opposite case they are blamed, since to endure the greatest indignities for no noble end or for a trifling end is the mark of an inferior person. On some actions praise is not bestowed, but pardon is, when one does what he [25] ought not under pressure which overstrains human nature and which no one could reasonably withstand. But some acts, perhaps, we cannot be forced to do, but ought rather to face death after the most fearful sufferings. Thus the events that “forced” Euripides’ Alcmaeon to slay his mother seem absurd. It is difficult sometimes to determine what should be chosen at [30] what cost, and what should be endured in return for what gain, and yet more difficult to abide by our decisions; for as a rule what is expected is painful, and what we are forced to do is base, whence praise and blame are bestowed on those who have been compelled or have not. [1110b] What sort of acts, then, should be called compulsory? We answer that without qualification actions are so when the cause is in the external circumstances 24 2 Virtue Ethics with Selections from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and the agent contributes nothing. Other circumstances are involuntary in themselves, but choice worthy on this occasion and whose moving principle is in the agent. These are in themselves [5] involuntary, but now and in return for these gains voluntary. They are more like voluntary acts; for actions are in the class of particulars, and the particular acts here are voluntary. What sort of things are to be chosen, and return for what, it is not easy to state; for there are many differences in the particular cases. But if some were to say that pleasant and noble objects have a compelling power, forcing [10] us from without, all acts would be for him compulsory; for it is for these objects that all men do everything they do. And those who act under compulsion and unwillingly act with pain, but those who do acts for their pleasantness and nobility do them with pleasure. Thus, it is absurd to make external circumstances [by themselves] responsible, and not oneself, as being easily caught by such attractions, and to make oneself responsible for noble acts but the pleasant objects [15] responsible for base acts. The compulsory, then, seems to be that whose moving principle is outside, the person compelled contributing nothing. Everything that is done by reason of ignorance is not voluntary; it is only what produces pain and repentance that is involuntary. For the man who has done something owing to [20] ignorance, and feels not the least vexation at his action, has not acted voluntarily, since he did not know what he was doing, nor yet involuntarily, since he is not pained. Of people, then, who act by reason of ignorance he who repents is thought an involuntary agent, and the man who does not repent may, since he is different, be called non-voluntary agent; for since he differs from the other, it is better that he should have a name of his own. Acting by reason of ignorance seems also to be different from acting in ignorance; for the [25] man who is drunk or in a rage is thought to act as a result not of ignorance but of one of the causes mention, yet not knowingly but in ignorance. Now every wicked man is ignorant of what he ought to do and what he ought to abstain from, and it is by reason of error of this kind that men become unjust and in general bad. But the [30] term ‘involuntary’ tends to be used not if a man is ignorant of what is to his advantage—for it is not mistaken purpose that causes involuntary action (it leads rather to wickedness), nor ignorance of the universal (for that men are blamed),7 but ignorance of particulars, i.e., of the circumstances of the action and the objects with which it is concerned. For it is on these that both [1111a] pity and pardon depend, since the person who is ignorant of any of these acts involuntarily. Perhaps it is just as well, therefore, to determine their nature and number. A man may be ignorant, then, of who he is, what he is doing, what or whom he is acting on, and sometimes also [5] what (e.g., what instrument) he is doing it with, and to what end (e.g., he may think his act will conduce to some one’s safety), and how he is doing it (e.g., whether gently or violently). Now all of these no one could be ignorant unless he were mad, and evidently also he could not be ignorant of the agent; for how could he not know himself? But of what he is doing a man might be 7 Cf. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat (ignorance of the law excuses no one). 2 Virtue Ethics with Selections from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics 25 ignorant, as for instance people say “it slipped out of their mouths as they were [10] speaking,” or “they did not know it was a secret,” as Aeschylus said of the mysteries,8 or a man might say he “let it go off when he merely wanted to show it working,” as the man did with the catapult. Again, one might think one’s son was an enemy, as Merope did, or that a pointed spear had a button on it, or that a stone was pumicestone; or one might give a man a draught to [15] save him, and really kill him; or one might want to touch a man, as people do in sparing and really wound him. The ignorance may relate, then, to any of these things, i.e., of the circumstances of the action, and the man who was ignorant of any of these is thought to have acted involuntarily, and especially if he was ignorant on the most important points; and these are thought to be the circumstances of the action and its end. Further, the doing of an act that is [20] called involuntary in virtue of ignorance of this sort must be painful and involve repentance. Since that which is done under compulsion or by reason of ignorance is involuntary, the voluntary would seem to be that of which the moving principle is the agent himself, he being aware of the particular circumstances of the action. Presumably acts done by reason of anger or [25] appetite are not rightly called involuntary. For in the first place, on that showing none of the other animals will act voluntarily, nor will children; and secondly, is it meant that we do not do voluntarily any of the acts that are due to appetite or anger, or that we do the noble acts voluntarily and the base acts involuntarily? Is not this absurd, when one and the same thing is [30] the cause? But it would surely be odd to describe as involuntary the things one ought to desire; and we ought both to be angry at certain things and to have an appetite for certain things, e.g., for health and for learning. Also what is involuntary is thought to be painful, but what is in accordance with appetite is thought to be pleasant. Again, what is the difference in respect of [1111b] involuntariness between errors committed upon calculation and those committed in anger? Both sorts of errors are to be avoided; and since the irrational passions seem to be no less human than reason is, actions which proceed from anger or appetite are also proper to humans. It would be odd, then, to treat them as involuntary. Argument 2.6 Justice is: (a) a relational virtue—law abidingness, and (b) a proper virtue via distribution and rectification. (Book Five. Chapters 1-7, 1129a 32-1132b 21) Let us take as a starting point, then, the various meanings of “an unjust man.” Both the lawless man and the greedy and unfair man are thought to be unjust, so that evidently both the law-abiding and the fair man will be just. The just, then, is the lawful and the fair, the unjust the unlawful and the unfair. [1129b] Since the unjust man is greedy, he must be concerned with goods— not all goods, but those with which prosperity and adversity have to do, which taken absolutely are always good, but for a particular person are not always good. Aeschylus was accused before the Areopagus of divulging the mysteries of Demeter in his tragedies, but the playwright was acquitted, cf. Plato, Republic 563c on the phrase attributed to Aeschylus on this occasion, “It came to my mouth.” 8 26 2 Virtue Ethics with Selections from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics Now men pray for and pursue [5] these things; but they should not. Rather, they should pray that the things that are good absolutely may also be good for them, and should choose the things that are good for them. The unjust man does not always choose the greater, but also the less—in the case of things bad absolutely; but because the lesser evil is itself thought to be in a sense comparatively good, [10] greediness is directed at the good, therefore he is thought to be greedy. In fact, he is unfair for this contains and is common to both. Since the lawless man was seen to be unjust and the law-abiding man just, evidently all lawful acts are in a sense just acts; for the acts laid down by the legislative art are lawful, and [15] each of these, we say, is just. Now the laws in their enactments on all subjects aim at the common advantage either of all or of the best or of those who hold power, or something of the sort. Therefore, in one sense we call those acts just that tend to produce and preserve happiness [20] and its components for the political society. And the law instructs us to perform the acts of a brave man (e.g., not to desert our post nor take to flight nor throw away our arms), and those of a temperate man (e.g., not to commit adultery nor to gratify one’s lust), and those of a good-tempered man (e.g., not to strike another nor to speak evil). Similarly with regard to the other virtues and forms of wickedness, commanding some acts and forbidding others; and the properly-framed law does this rightly, and the hastily conceived one less well. [25] This form of justice, then, is complete virtue, but not absolutely, but in relation to our neighbor. And therefore justice is often thought to be the greatest of virtues, and “neither evening nor morning star.”9 It is wonderful and gives rise to the proverb, “in justice is every [30] virtue is found complete.”10 And it is complete virtue in its fullest sense, because it is the actual exercise of complete virtue. It is complete because he who possesses it can exercise his virtue not only in himself but towards his neighbor also; for many men can exercise virtue in their own affairs, but not in their [1130a] relation to their neighbor. This is why the saying of Bias is thought to be true, that “rule will show the man;”11 for a ruler is necessarily in relation to other men and a member of a society. For this same reason justice, alone of the virtues, is thought to be “another’s good”12 [5] because it is related to our neighbor; for it does what is advantageous to another, either a ruler or a fellow member of the community. Now the worst man is he who exercises his wickedness both towards himself and towards others. The best man is not he who exercises his virtue [only] towards himself but [also] towards another; for this is a difficult task. Justice in this sense, then, [10] is not part of virtue but virtue entire, nor is the contrary injustice a part of vice but vice entire. What the difference is between virtue and justice in this sense is plain from what we have said; they are the same but their essence is not the same. Insofar as virtue is related to one’s Perhaps a quotation from Euripides’ lost play Melanippe. Theognis, 147. 11 Bias was one of the seven sages of Greece, known for his wisdom. 12 Plato, Republic 343c. 9 10 2 Virtue Ethics with Selections from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics 27 neighbor, it is justice. Insofar as it is a certain kind of state without qualification, it is virtue. ∗∗∗ [1130b 6] It is clear, then, that there is more than one kind of justice, and there is one which is distinct from virtue entire; we must try to grasp its genus and differentia. ∗∗∗ [1130b 30] Special justice and the corresponding ways for something to be just need to be classified: (a) one kind is that which is manifested in distribution of honor or money or the other things that fall to be divided among those who have a share in the constitution (for in these it is possible for one man to have a share either unequal or equal to that of another), and (b) another [1131a] kind is that which plays a rectifying part in transactions between individuals. Of this latter sort there are two additional divisions of transactions: (a) some are voluntary and (b) others involuntary—voluntary such transactions as sale, purchase, loan for consumption, pledging, loan [5] for use, depositing, letting (they are called voluntary because the origin of these transactions is voluntary). Concerning the involuntary some are clandestine, such as theft, adultery, poisoning, procuring, enticement of slaves, assassination, false witness, and others are violent, such as assault, imprisonment, murder, robbery with violence, mutilation, abuse, insult. CHAPTER 3. We have shown that both the unjust man and the unjust act are unfair or unequal. Now it is clear that there is also an intermediate between the two unequals involved in either case. And this is the equal; for in any kind of action in which there is a more and a less there is also what is equal.13 If, then, the unjust is unequal, the just is equal, (as all men suppose it to be, even apart from argument). And since the equal is intermediate, the just will be an [15] intermediate. Now equality implies at least two things. The just, then, must be both intermediate and equal and relative (i.e., for certain persons). And qua intermediate it must be between certain things (which are respectively greater and less); qua equal, it involves two things; qua just, it is for certain people. The just, therefore, involves at least four terms; for the persons for whom it is in fact just are two and the things in which it is manifested, the objects [20] distributed, are two. ∗∗∗ [25] Further, this is plain from the fact that awards should be according to merit; for all men agree that what is just in distribution must be according to merit in some sense, though they do not all specify the same sort of merit. For example, democrats identify it with the status of freeman, supporters of oligarchy with wealth (or with noble birth), and supporters of aristocracy with excellence. 13 The “equal” here is an intermediate or mean. 28 2 Virtue Ethics with Selections from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics [30] The just, then, is a species of the proportionate (proportion being not a property only of the kind of number which consists of abstract units, but of numbers in general). For proportion is equality of ratios and involves four terms at least (that discrete proportion involves four terms [1131b] is plain, but so does continuous proportion, for it uses one term as two and mentions it twice; e.g., “as the line A is to the line B, so is the line B to the line C;” the line B, then, has been mentioned twice, so that if the line B be assumed twice, the proportional terms will be four). What is just also involves at least four terms, and the ratio between one pair is the same as that [5] between the other pair; for there is a similar distinction between the persons and between the things. As the term A, then, is to B, so will C be to D, in the same way. As A is to C, B will be so to D. Therefore also the whole is in the same ratio to the whole; and this coupling the distribution effects, and, if the terms are so combined, effects justly. The conjunction, then of [10] the term A with C and of B with D is what is just distribution14 and this species of the just is intermediate, and the unjust is what violates the proportion; for the proportional is intermediate, and the just is proportional. (Mathematicians call this kind of proportion geometrical; for it is in geometrical proportion that it follows that the whole is to the whole as [15] either part is to the corresponding part.) This proportion is not continuous; for we cannot get a single term standing for a person and a thing. This, then is what the just is—the proportional; the unjust is what violates the proportion. Hence one term becomes too great, the other too small, as indeed happens in practice; for the man who acts unjustly has too much, and the man who is unjustly treated too little, of what is [20] good. In the case of evil the reverse is true; for the lesser evil is reckoned a good comparison with the greater evil, since the lesser evil is rather to be chosen than the greater, and what is worthy of choice is good, and what is worthier of choice is a greater good. This, then, is one species of the just. [25] CHAPTER 4. The remaining one is the rectification, which arises in connection with transactions both voluntary and involuntary. This form of the just has a different specific character from the former. For the justice which distributes common possessions is always in accordance with the kind of proportion mentioned above (for in the case also in which the distribution is made from the common funds of a partnership it will be according to the same [30] ratio which the funds put into the business by the partners bear to one another); and the injustice opposed to this kind of justice is that which violates the proportion. But the justice in [1132a] transactions between two people is a sort of equality indeed, and the injustice a sort of inequality; not according to that kind of proportion, however, but according to arithmetical proportion.15 For it makes no difference whether a good man has defrauded a bad man or a bad man a good one, nor whether it is a good or bad man that has A (first person): B (second person):: C (first person): D (second person), then (alternando) A:C:: B:D, and thus (componendo) A + C: B + D:: A: B. Thus, position establishes the judgment on the relative merits of the parties. 15 It is important here to distinguish “rectification” justice and “retributive” justice. The former is about bringing back a balance that has gotten out of proportion while the latter is about punishment. However, the former may be a part of the latter: rectification may be part of a punishment phase. 14 2 Virtue Ethics with Selections from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics 29 committed adultery; the law looks [5] only to the distinctive character of the injury, and treats the parties as equal, if one is in the wrong and the other is being wronged, and if one inflicted injury and the other has received it. Therefore, this kind of injustice being an inequality, the judge tries to equalize it; for in the case also in which one has received and the other has inflicted a wound, or one has slain and the other has been slain, the suffering and the action have been unequally distributed; but the judge tries to [10] equalize things by means of a penalty, taking away the gain of the assailant. For the term ‘gain’ is applied generally to such cases, even if it be not a term appropriate to certain cases, e.g., to the person who inflicts a wound—and ‘loss’ to the sufferer; at all events when the suffering has been estimated, the one is called loss and the other gain. Therefore the equal is intermediate [15] between the greater and the less, but the gain and the loss are respectively greater and the less in contrary ways; more of the good and less of the evil are gain, and the contrary is loss. Intermediate is between them, as we saw,16 the equal, which we say is just; therefore corrective [20] justice will be intermediate between loss and gain. This is why, when people dispute, they appeal to a judge. They appeal to the judge for justice. For the judge is meant to be a living exemplar of justice, and they seek the judge as an intermediate. In some states they call judges mediators, on the assumption that if they get what is intermediate they will get what is just. The just, then, is an intermediate, since the judge is so. Now the judge restores equality; it is as [25] though there were a line divided into unequal parts, and he took away that by which the greater segment exceeds the half, and added it to the smaller segment. And when the whole has been equally divided, then they say they have “their own”—i.e., when they have got what is [30] equal. The equal is intermediate between the greater and the lesser line according to arithmetical proportion. It is for this reason also that it is called just (dikaion), because it is a division into two equal parts (dicha), just as if one were to call it (dichaion); and the judge (dicastes) is one who bisects (dichastes). For when something is subtracted from one of two equals and added to the other, the other is in excess by these two; since if what was taken from the one had not been added to the other, the latter would have been in excess by one part only. [1132b] Hence, the larger part exceeds the intermediate by one, and the intermediate exceeds by one part that from which something was taken. By this, then, we shall recognize both what we must subtract from that which has more, and what we must add to that which has less; we must [5] add to the latter that by which the intermediate exceeds it, and subtract from the greatest that by which it exceeds the intermediate. Let the lines AA’, BB’, CC’ be equal to one another; from the line AA’ let the segment AE be subtracted, and to the line CC’ let the segment CD17 be added so that the whole line DCC’ exceeds the line EA’ by the segment CD and the segment CF; therefore it exceeds the line BB’ by the segment CD. 16 17 I.14. i.e., equal to AE. 30 2 Virtue Ethics with Selections from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics A_____E_______________A’ B_____________________B’ D____C______F______________C’ These names, both loss and gain, have come from voluntary exchange; for to have more than one’s own is called gaining, and to have less than one’s original share is called losing, e.g., in [15] buying and selling and in all other matters in which the law has left people free to make their own terms; but when they get neither more nor less but just what belongs to themselves, they say that they have their own and that they neither lose nor gain. Therefore the just is intermediate between a sort of gain and a sort of loss, viz., those [20] which are involuntary18; it consists in having an equal amount before and after the transaction. Argument 2.7 Though there may be instances of bestiality and insanity as reasons for evil action, in the main, it is akrasia (incontinence) and akolasia (intemperance) with the latter being more blamable than the former (Book Seven. Chapter 1, 1145a 15-1150a 32) [1145a 15] Let’s begin with a fresh start by setting out the conditions of moral character to be avoided: vice (kakia), incontinence (akrasia), and bestiality (theriotes). Their opposites are called virtue (arete) and continence (egkrateian).19 *** [1145b 15] A starting point of our investigation is to ask: (a) whether the continent man (egkrates) and the incontinent (akrates) man are differentiated by their objects or by their attitude, i.e., whether the incontinent man is incontinent simply by being concerned with such and such objects, or instead by his attitude, or instead of that by both these things; (b) the second question is whether incontinence and continence are concerned with any and every object or not. The man who is incontinent in the unqualified sense is neither concerned with any and every object, but with precisely those [20] with which the intemperate (akolastos) man is concerned, nor is he characterized by being simply related to these (for then his state would be the same as the intemperate), but by being related to them in a certain way. For the one (intemperate) is led on in accordance with his own choice, thinking that he ought always to pursue the present pleasure; while the other (incontinent) does not think so, but yet pursues it. [25] Some claim that the incontinent person’s action conflicts with true belief and not with knowledge. But it makes no difference for the argument whether it is either. This is because some people with belief think they have exact knowledge. If, then, the notion is that owing to their weak conviction those who have opinion are For the loser. Being recklessly out of control without care, akolasia, is also paired with temperate, sophrosune. 18 19 2 Virtue Ethics with Selections from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics 31 more likely to act against their judgment than those who know, we answer that there need be no difference between knowledge and opinion in this respect; for some men are no less convinced of what they think than others of what they know; as [30] is shown by the case of Heraclitus.20 But in the first instance, since we use the word ‘know’ in two senses (for both the man who has knowledge but is not using it and he who is using it are said to know), it will make a difference whether, when a man does what he should not, he has the knowledge but is not exercising it, or is exercising it; for the latter seems strange but not the former. [35] Further [in a second sense], since there are two kinds of premises, there is nothing to prevent a man’s [1147a] having both premises and acting against his knowledge, provided that he is using only the universal premise and not the particular; for it is particular acts that have to be done. And there are also two kinds of universal term; one is predicable of the agent, the other of the object; [5] e.g., “dry food is good for every man,” and “I am a man,” or “such and such good is dry.” Knowledge of the particular is like “this food is such and such.” The incontinent man either has not or is not exercising his knowledge.21 There will, then, be first an enormous difference between these manners of knowing, so that to know in one way when we act incontinently would not seem anything strange, while to know in the other way would be extraordinary. [10] And further, humans may have knowledge in another [third] sense. For we see that having but not using is something that sometimes happens to men. For within the case of having knowledge but not using it we see a difference of state, admitting of the possibility of having knowledge in a sense and yet not having it, as in the instance of a man asleep, mad, or drunk. [15] But now this is just the condition of men under the influence of passion (e.g., outbursts of anger and sexual appetites and some other such passions). It is clear that these outbursts actually alter our bodily condition, and in some men even produce fits of madness. It is plain, then, that incontinent people must be said to be in a similar condition to men asleep, mad, or drunk. The [20] fact that men use the language that flows from knowledge proves nothing. Because even men under the influence of these passions sometimes utter scientific proofs and recite verses of Empedocles. And those who have just begun to learn a science can string together its phrases, but do not yet know fully the content of their partial expressions. This is because these expressions have become part of themselves [and their memory. To create such memories] takes time; so that we must suppose that the use of language by men in an incontinent state means no more than its utterance by actors on the stage. [25] Again, we may also view the cause [in a fourth sense] as follows with reference to the facts of human nature. The one opinion is universal, the other is Heraclitus believed that in the realm of nature (phusis) that seeming and its consequent opinion were the same as knowledge. 21 I.e., If I am to be able to deduce from (a) “dry food is good for all men” that “this food is good for me,” I must have (b) the premise “I am a man” and (c) the premises (i) “x food is dry,” (ii) “this food is x.” I cannot fail to know (b), and I may know (c) and (i), or know it only “at the back of my mind,” I shall not draw conclusion. 20 32 2 Virtue Ethics with Selections from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics concerned with the particular facts, and here we come to something within the sphere of perception; when a single opinion results from the two, the soul must in one type of case22 affirm the conclusion, while in the case of opinions concerned with production it must immediately act (e.g., if “everything sweet ought [30] to be tasted,” and “this thing before me is sweet,” in the sense of being one of the particular sweet things, the man who can act and is not prevented must at the same time actually act accordingly). When, then the universal opinion is present in us forbidding us to taste, and there is also the opinion that “everything sweet is pleasant,” and that “this thing before me is sweet” (now this is the opinion that is active),23 and when appetite happens to be present in us, the one [35] opinion bids us avoid the object, but appetite leads us towards it (for it can move each of our bodily parts). Therefore, it turns out that a man behaves incontinently under the influence (in a [1147b] sense) of a rule and an opinion, and of one not contrary in itself, but only incidentally—for the appetite is contrary, not the opinion—to the right rule. It also follows that this is the reason why the lower animals are not incontinent, viz. because they have no universal judgment [5] but only imagination and memory of the particular. The explanation of how the ignorance is dissolved and the incontinent man regains his knowledge, is the same as in the case of the man drunk or asleep and is not particular to this condition; we must go to the students of natural science for it. Now, the last premise being both [10] an opinion about a perceptible object, and being what determines our actions. This is a man who either has not knowledge when he is in the state of passion, or has it in the sense in which having knowledge did not mean true knowing (in the sense of actually being able to use it) but only talking, as a drunken man may mutter the verses of Empedocles. And because the last term [15] is not universal nor equally an object of scientific knowledge with the universal term, the position that Socrates sought to establish24 actually seems to result. When the failure of self-restraint25 occurs it is not in the presence of what is thought to be knowledge proper that the affection of incontinence arises (nor is it this that is dragged about as a result of the state of passion), but in that of perceptual knowledge.26 This must suffice as our answer to the question of action with and without knowledge, and how it is possible to behave incontinently with knowledge. *** [1148a 5] But of the people who are incontinent with respect to bodily enjoyments, which we say the temperate and the intemperate men are concerned, he who pursues the i.e., scientific reasoning. i.e., determines action. 24 1145b 22–24. 25 Here emotion, to pathos, means akrateuesthai (moral weakness), cf. II.2, II. 12, IV.6. But in the following line it probably refers to epithumos (desire) or thumos (spirited emotion) as in III.7, VII.8. 26 Even before the minor premise of the practical syllogism has been obscured by passion, the incontinent man has not scientific knowledge in the strict sense, since his minor premise is not universal but has for its subject a sensible particular, e.g., “this glass of wine.” 22 23 2 Virtue Ethics with Selections from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics 33 excesses of things pleasant—and shuns those of things painful, of hunger and thirst and heat and cold and all the [10] objects of touch and taste—not by choice but contrary to his choice and his judgment, is called incontinent, not with the qualification “in respect of this or that,” e.g., of anger. This is confirmed by the fact that men are called “soft” with regard to these pleasures, but not with regard to any of the others. And for this reason we group together the incontinent (akrates) and the intemperate (akolasia), the continent (egkrate) and the temperate man (sophrona)— but not [15] any of these other types—because they are concerned somehow with the same pleasures and pains; but though these are concerned with the same objects, they are not similarly related to them, but some of them make a deliberate choice while the others do not.27 ∗∗∗ [1148b 15] CHAPTER 5. Some things are pleasant by nature, and of these (a) some are without qualification, and (b) others are so with reference to particular classes either of animals or men. Other things are not pleasant by nature, but (a) some of them become so by reason of injuries to the system, and (b) others by reason of acquired habits, and (c) others by reason of originally bad natures. This being so, it is possible with regard to each of the latter kinds to discover similar states of character to those recognized with regard to the former. I mean (A) brutish states, [20] as in the case of the female who, they say rips open pregnant women and devours the infants, or of the things in which some of the tribes about the Black Sea that have gone savage are said to delight—in raw meat or in human flesh, or in lending their children to one another to feast upon—or of the story told of Phalaris.28 These states are brutish, but (B) others arise as a result of disease (or, in some cases, of [25] madness, as with the man who sacrificed and ate his mother, or with the slave who ate the liver of his fellow slave). And there are other morbid states (C) resulting from custom, e.g., the habit of plucking out the hair or of gnawing the nails, or even coals or earth, and in addition to [30] these pederasty; for these arise in some by nature and in others, as in those who have been the victims of lust from childhood, from habit. ∗∗∗ [1149a 21] That incontinence and continence, then, are concerned only with the same objects as intemperance and temperance and that which is concerned with other objects is a type distinct from incontinence, and called incontinence by a metaphor and not simply, is plain. CHAPTER 6. That incontinence in respect of anger is less disgraceful than intemperance (in respect of the appetites) is what we will now proceed to see.29 (1) Anger seems to listen to [25] argument to some extent, but to mishear it, as do hasty The temperate and the intemperate not the continent and the incontinent. Phalaris was a tyrant of Akragas (now Agrigento in Sicily) who was a brutal man who went so far as to engage in cannibalism (including young children in the first year of life). 29 Here we see the guts of the argument about whether akrasia or akolasia is worse. 27 28 34 2 Virtue Ethics with Selections from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics servants who run out before they have heard the whole of what one says, and then muddle the order, or as dogs bark if there is but a knock at the door, before looking to see if it is a friend; so anger by reason of the warmth and [30] hastiness of its nature, though it hears, does not hear an order, and springs to take revenge. For argument or imagination informs us that we have been insulted or slighted, and anger, reasoning as it were that anything like this must be fought against, boils up straightway; while [35] appetite, if argument or perception merely says that an object is pleasant, springs to the enjoyment of it. [1149b] Therefore, anger obeys the argument in a way, but appetite does not. Incontinence from appetite is therefore more disgraceful. For the man who is incontinent in respect of anger is in a sense conquered by argument, while the other is conquered by appetite and not by argument. (2) Further, we pardon people more easily for following natural desires, since we pardon [5] them more easily for following such appetites as are common to all men, and in so far as they are common; now anger and bad temper are more natural than the appetites for excess, i.e., for unnecessary objects. Take for instance the man who defended himself on the charge of striking [10] his father by saying “Yes, but he struck his father, and he struck his, and. (pointing to the child) “This boy will strike me when he is a man; it runs in the family.” Or the man who when he was being dragged along by his son bade him stop at the doorway since he himself had dragged his father only as far as that. (3) Further, those who are more given to plotting against others are more criminal. Now [15] a passionate man is not given to plotting, nor is anger itself—it is open; but the nature of appetite is illustrated by what the poets call Aphrodite, “the wile-weaving daughter of Cyprus,”30 and by Homer’s words about her “embroidered girdle”: And the whisper of wooing is there Whose cajoling steals the wits of even the wisest.31 Therefore, it this form of incontinence is more criminal and disgraceful than that in respect of anger, it is both incontinence without qualification and (in a sense) vice. [20] (4) Further, no one commits wanton outrage with a feeling of pain, but everyone who acts in anger acts with pain, while the man who commits outrage acts with pleasure. If, then, those acts at which it is most just to be angry are more criminal than others, the incontinence which is due to appetite is more criminal; for there is no wanton outrage involved in anger. Plainly, then the incontinence concerned with appetite is more disgraceful than that [25] ...
 

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