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Suppose that there is asymmetric information in the market for used cars
Suppose that there is asymmetric information in the market for used cars. Sellers know the quality of the car that they are selling, but buyers do not. Buyers know that there is a 30% chance of getting a "lemon," a low quality used car. A high quality used car is worth $30,000, and a low quality used car is worth $15,000. Based on this probability, the most that a buyer would be willing to pay for a used car is what? (Enter your response rounded to the nearest dollar.) Which of the following would best "solve" the asymmetric information problem in this market?
Expert Solution
Buyer's willingness to pay can be calculated as follows:
Buyers know that there is a 30% chance of getting a lemon and 70% chance of a high quality car.
The worth of high quality used car is $30,000.
The worth of a low quality used car is $15,000
Willingness (W) to pay for a used car,
W=30100×15000+70100×30000W=4500+21000W=25500W=30100×15000+70100×30000W=4500+21000W=25500
Therefore, the value that a buyer is willing to pay is $25,500.
There are many ways that can help to overcome asymmetric information namely, guarantees and warranties, availability of information, taxes and subsidies, monitoring and controlling and industrial standards.
The availability of information would best solve the asymmetric information in this market as a consumer would then be able to differentiate between a low and high quality used car and this will help to promote better customer satisfaction.
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