If you buy a new car and try to sell it in the first year, (in the first few weeks after you buy it), the price that you get is substantially less than the original price

The same model of information asymmetry can be applied in the example aforementioned in the question in which I am trying to sell my new car in the first year itself and the price which is offered to me by the buyers is substantially low.

The model assumes that there is information asymmetry, the sellers have no credible disclosure technology so that they can convince the buyers of the quality of their product, there is an incentive for the sellers to pass off a low-quality product as a high-quality product, the buyers are pessimistic about the motives of the sellers and there is a low number of public quality assurances that can be quoted effective.

The pessimistic nature of my buyer will signal him to believe that only a grave flaw in the product is compelling me to sell it in the first year itself without even using it for a time period in which it can be thoroughly analyzed. His pessimism, coupled with his disbelief into my motives, will translate into a price that is extremely low compared to the original price. Since I have no means to disclose the quality of my product credibly, I will be offered an extremely low price which is consistent with Akerlof's Lemons Model.