Consider the following perfect information game (14

Economics Dec 11, 2020

Consider the following perfect information game (14.5) 1 . L 04 2 2 b d c + w E 0 ch
2 2. a b d . W 2 1 2 0 E 3 2 0 (a) Find the backward-induction solutions (b) Write down all the strategies of Player 1 (c) Write down all the strategies of Player 2. (d) Write the strategic form associated with this game, (e) Does Player I have a dominant strategy c Does Player 2 have a dominant strategy? (g) Is there a dominant-strategy equilibrium (h) Docs Player I have any dominated strategies? Does Player 2 have any dominated strategies? What do you get when you apply the iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies IK) What are the Nash equilibra

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