Model Output by Firm Industry Quantity Profits By Firm Industry Profits Price Cournot QFirm1 = ? Market output = ? units πFirm1 = ? Industry Profits = ? QFirm2 = ? πFirm2 = ? Stackelberg QLeader = ? Market output = ? Units πLeader = ? Industry Profits = ? QFollower = ? πFollower = ? Bertrand Market output = ? Units Industry Profits = ? Collusion [Duopoly] QFirm1 = ? Market output = ? units πFirm1 = ? Industry Profits = ? QFirm2 = ? πFirm2 = ? Two firms compete in a market to sell a homogeneous product with inverse demand function P = 600 − 3Q

Economics Apr 22, 2023

Model	Output by Firm	Industry Quantity	Profits By Firm	Industry Profits	Price
Cournot	Q_Firm1 = ?	Market output = ? units	π_Firm1 = ?	Industry Profits = ?
	Q_Firm2 = ?		π_Firm2 = ?
Stackelberg	Q_Leader = ?	Market output = ? Units	π_Leader = ?	Industry Profits = ?
	Q_Follower = ?		π_Follower = ?
Bertrand		Market output = ? Units		Industry Profits = ?
Collusion [Duopoly]	Q_Firm1 = ?	Market output = ? units	π_Firm1 = ?	Industry Profits = ?
	Q_Firm2 = ?		π_Firm2 = ?

Two firms compete in a market to sell a homogeneous product with inverse demand

function P = 600 − 3Q. Each firm produces at a constant marginal cost of $300 and has no fixed costs. Use this information to compare the output levels and profits in settings characterized by Cournot, Stackelberg, Bertrand, and collusive behavior.

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